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ABSTRACT 
THE MORALITY OF CHINESE LEGALISM: HAN FEI’S ADVANCED 
PHILOSOPHY  
SEPTEMBER 2019 
YUAN KE, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor David K. Schneider 
 Legalism, as one of the most useful philosophies of government, has attracted 
a great deal of scholarly attention. The work of Han Fei—one of the most influential 
proponents of Legalism—has been scrutinized and critiqued for centuries as immoral. 
I intend to show Legalism, especially the Han Feizi, is moral through focusing on four 
aspects of Han Fei’s work. First, his understanding of human nature. Han Fei states 
people are born with a hatred of harm and a love of profit. This understanding of 
human nature can never lead to a cognitive distortions in governing. So it is a moral 
basic of a philosophy. The second element is a focus on the context of Han Fei’s 
writings. If his works are read in detail back to his age, one cannot reach an 
immorality conclusion. Then, based on his understanding of subjects and his 
correspondingly suggested strategies, his goal is moral because he wants to built a 
peaceful and stable society, which was unobtainable at that time. Finally, Han Fei’s 
conception of punishment, which has been thought of immoral, actually is a moral 
tool to protect the majority of subjects who are innocent.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 It has been long misunderstood that the ideal state of Legalism is that of the 
Qin dynasty.  Some Confucian scholars and human rights doctrine scholars have 1
argued that Legalism is immoral. The judgement of Chinese history is that Legalism 
is immoral because the Qin dynasty was a short dynasty that only lasted for about 
fifteen years and then was overturned by revolt. Scholars, for example, Schneider and 
Graham, have criticized Legalism’s ideal model according to this unsuccessful 
application of Legalism. Somehow, they neglected actuality. Legalism became the 
essential in governance after its birth because of its practicability. No matter what 
core philosophy the government claims to apply, Legalism is always the core. The 
Han Feizi contains most of Legalist political strategies and Han Fei combines his own 
perspectives with others’. Hansen identifies Han Fei’s philosophy as one of the most 
practical ones:  
Han Feizi’s writings were erudite, rich in historical detail and 
examples. He had learnt philosophy, but added little original 
philosophy of his own. His writings were almost purely practical.   2
 This paper seeks to demonstrate that moral dimensions existed in ancient 
Legalism, and to challenge previous studies that have suggested otherwise. Legalism, 
contrary to the belief of most scholars of Chinese history over the years, is not 
immoral; it is a moral philosophy. Certain scholars have begun to ask questions about 
this. Winston in particular argues that Legalism is actually a moral philosophy 
 Wang Zhantong, “Qin’s death is not Legalism’s fault 秦朝灭亡非法家思想之罪,” 1
Journal of Ancient Books Collation and Studies 2012.9:5 at 4.
 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Thought, p.345.2
	 !  1
because there is morality in it, and that it is therefore not immoral.  I concur that 3
Legalism is not immoral, although my argument differs from Winston’s in some 
important ways.  
Winston argues that internal morality exists in Legalism. This idea goes 
sharply against conventional understanding. To support his analysis of Han Fei’s 
philosophy, Winston uses other scholars’ legal theories, such as John Austin’s Rule by 
Law, which systematically elaborates that law is imperative, peremptory, morally 
arbitrary, coercive, and an instrument of domination.  Winston also cites Lon Fuller’s 4
account that states it is necessary to link morality to law, and that internal morality 
exists in law. Winston quotes the Han Feizi in detail to highlight the moral aspects of 
Legalism. For example, he states that the impersonality of law is moral because it 
limits the ruler’s self-interests. Similar analysis drawing on issues such as generality, 
publicity, and clarity will be discussed in the main body of the paper. Winston’s 
perspectives show the moral dimensions of Legalism, but this paper seeks to re-define 
and prove those moral dimensions correspondingly. This paper was inspired by 
Winston’s analysis, as some of his ideas are compelling, but they have hitherto only 
been proven in a limited way. 
 Another relevant study is that of Henrique Schneider, whose view of Legalism 
is negative. This paper engages with Schneider’s scholarship to explore how he 
expresses his criticism of Han Fei’s philosophy. Schneider critiques the practicability 
of applying Legalism, to show that Han Fei’s moral thinking, which does not rely on 
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 3
Legal Studies, (December 2005), P315
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 4
Legal Studies, (December 2005), P316-319
	 !  2
individuals’ morality, is immoral. Schneider also questions the existence of Legalism 
in governance, and suggests that the application of Legalism is immoral because it is 
only an instrument of the government. He doubts Han Fei’s morality in reducing the 
ruler’s power as it is contradictory to another governance strategy: to control 
everything.  Schneider queries the core of Han Fei’s political philosophy because Han 5
Fei seemed to agree with Taoist ideas. This thesis seeks to challenge some of 
Schneider’s views, and to propose some alternative interpretations, in order to show 
Legalism’s moral dimension.  
 This paper focuses on the text of the Han Feizi. The moral dimensions of 
Legalist philosophy are going to be proved by discussing the following four aspects 
using original texts: 
1. Understanding of human nature. This is the basis of any philosophy. Without a 
feasible understanding of human nature, any philosophy is just a mirage, and 
unpractical stipulations are immoral for people. This paper claims that Han Fei 
improves other philosophers’ perspectives about human nature and fixes them into 
a practical mode. Han Fei’s opinion about human nature is that it is instinctual. 
Humans are born with love of profit and hatred of harm. Because of this, Han Fei 
distrusts the internal morality of human beings. Instead, he promotes law as the 
means of shaping humans’ actions to benefit the entire society. Crucially, although 
this interpretation of people as focused on individual profit may appear immoral, it 
can in fact be construed as moral when examined in a general way.   
2. Synthesis of multiple philosophical perspectives. Han Fei did not create everything 
himself; he adopted widely from others’ strong points, not only from Legalists, but 
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.35
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also others. In the Han Feizi, he adapts Legalists’ political strategies and fixed 
them before combining them with others. He improved the Confucian idea of 
inheritance, construing it in terms of applying age’s discretion rather than simply 
copying, because he foresaw sticking to convention would result in chaos, which 
is immoral to the majority. He quoted Laozi’s philosophy of the Way and 
combined it with his governing philosophies to form a mixture of morality. One 
the one hand, this expresses Han Fei’s perspective on morality. On the other hand, 
it refutes some research that has unfairly critiqued Han Fei for supposedly 
ignoring morality in his philosophy.  
3. Han Fei’s ideal society. Moral ideas are contained in his ideal society, and when 
these dimensions are exposed from the core of his philosophy, they become cogent 
evidence of Legalism’s morality. His ideal society requires a ruler who is not 
necessarily a sage. This is moral because it reduces dependency on individual 
morality, as rulers are also humans, and human nature has been thought to be 
distrusted in Legalism because of Han Fei’s conception of “Utility” human nature 
(see Section 3.1). It is moral because it contains as few interference subjects as 
possible in order to establish a stable and peaceful society, which is the 
fundamental framework in which morality can be discussed. It promulgates law 
clearly and publicly. It is moral because it warns people before they act and it 
cautions wrongdoers to limit their behavior. It is moral because it operates teams 
of law executors to make sure the law is strictly applied in order to protect 
majorities who are not evil. Han Fei’s philosophy suggests that confining human 
freedom coincides with neglecting individual morality. His moral thinking can 
been revealed when all his arguments have been scrutinized. Unlike other 
	 !  4
philosophers who wanted to educate subjects to foster their moral thinking in order 
to let them build a moral state, he tried to reverse the process. Han Fei clearly 
knew what is prioritized by subjects and he tried to use Legalist ideas to build up a 
state that could satisfy urgent needs. His idea was that that well-organized society 
would further stimulate morality. 
4. Misunderstandings of Han Fei’s text. People who think Legalism is immoral tend 
to base this judgement on a few specific texts. If their misreading of Han Fei’s 
theory can been corrected, the morality of Legalism can be demonstrated. To this 
end, direct quotations from the Han Feizi are the best primary evidence. Indeed, 
the misunderstanding of Han Fei’s work has been promulgated through the broad 
influence of secondary sources such as research articles. 
 This thesis also discusses other relevant topics, such as cruel torture and 
political strategies, based on close reading of the original text of the Han Feizi. 
Additional sources are drawn from Legalism’s ancestors. The works of Shen Pu-hai 
and Shen Dao, and the Book of Lord Shang are cited to support this paper’s argument 
about the morality of Legalism. 
 Translations cited in this paper are all from published resources translated by 
well known scholars. Any deviations and misleads only represent their 
understandings. They will not effect the foundation of this thesis as explanations and 
analysis are all based on original text.  
	 !  5
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Contemporary scholars are interested in arguing about the morality of ancient 
Chinese Legalism, some of them hold an opinion that Legalism is immoral. Henrique 
Schneider has highlighted where he thought Han Fei went wrong, and has identified 
apparent contradictions in Han Fei’s philosophy. In contrast to Schneider, Winston 
advocates that internal morality exists in Han Fei’s philosophy. Their studies inspired 
me; their limitations and deviations initiated my study in finding the morality of 
ancient Chinese Legalism.   
2.1 Review of Schneider 
 Schneider’s “Where Han Fei Errs” seeks to demonstrate how Han Fei was 
wrong. When Schneider did his research with this idea in mind, he was affected by 
bias. He is good at organizing materials, but there are mistakes and misunderstandings 
in his analysis, especially in some neutral aspects. Perspective really depends on 
which direction people come from, and Schneider comes from a negative standpoint. 
So, when he analyzes Han Fei’s political philosophy, bias influences him to find 
immorality, and some apparent mistakes lead to his argument that Legalism is 
immoral. He partially endorses Ivanhoe’s idea that Han Fei was influenced by Taoism 
as well as the idea that expecting self-cultivated morality is infeasible, but Schneider 
questions whether that combination of philosophies, which mixes the Taoist idea of 
Wu Wei 6 with Legalism’s idea of the ruler staying isolated, is practical.  6
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.56
	 !  6
Schneider critiques the Taoist idea because, in his view, Wu Wei requires rulers 
to stay behind the stage and let the machinery of their institutions govern. Schneider 
then doubts the existence of Kingship as, in the Wu Wei conception, Kingship is a 
symbol rather than a key role of the state. Later in the paper, he also questions 
Legalism’s ideas regarding “isolation” and “mysteries”. “Isolation” in Legalism 
requires the ruler to alienate others in case some of people close to the ruler threat the 
ruler. “Mysteries" in Legalism requires the ruler hide his motions to prevent his 
behaviors are predicted by others. These two are controversial for Schneider because 
he doubts whether a mediocre ruler could strictly constrain his interests and apply 
Legalism’s political philosophies.  These two perspectives can both be explicitly 7
resolved by analyzing original texts.  
 As mentioned, Schneider concurs with Ivanhoe’s (2011) opinion that the 
Taoist Way influenced Han Fei. Schneider also agrees with Han Fei's understanding 
of the Way. However, he claims that there is a contradiction between these two 
philosophies:  
He [Han Fei] sees the philosopher theorizing for a less-than-active 
monarch, a figure in the shadows that acts barely on the basis of short-
term interest, because not acting may be in his long-term best interest. 
This poses a prima facie contradiction: while on the one hand Hanfei is 
supposed to argue for an almost almighty, strong state that ultimately 
controls every citizen, on the other hand he gives the monarch no 
power of this powerful state, constraining the ruler to an existence of 
abstention from power in order to maintain power.  8
However, the Taoist Wu Wei has been misinterpreted. Schneider translates Wu Wei into 
Not Acting. Therefore, he suggests that Kingship in this condition is redundant. The 
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.87
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.38
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King is largely superfluous.  But when original text of Taoism is reviewed in context, 9
it is clear that Wu Wei does not mean a ruler should do nothing in governance. Rather, 
it represents the ideal case in governance; that is, when the state has already been 
organized in the right way and the task of the ruler is to maintain this way of 
governing. Both sides in this antithesis are moral; it is not the case that one is moral, 
the other has to be immoral. Exercising ultimate control is not immoral in the 
beginning as every piece of the state has to be thoroughly scrutinized. Even in later 
governance, controlling every citizen cannot been thought of as immoral because 
everything and everyone has to stick to the principles and be monitored. Wu Wei is 
moral when the state has already been organized well; in such a case, Wu Wei means it 
reduces the ruler’s self-interest as well as not breaking promulgated rules. It does not 
conflict with exercising ultimate control because other tools have been applied to 
substitute the ruler’s responsibility under the ruler’s monitor.  
76B6ȎbúĲŎAȐÏj¢Ȏ¢BőWȐƱ
jŽA%6[AƿȐŽA%6[AƿȐījőȎő%ÎȐ	
j\Ȏ  10
The way never acts, yet nothing is left undone. Should lords and 
princes be able to hold fast to it, the myriad creatures will be 
transformed of their own accord. After they are transformed, should 
desire raise its head, I shall press it down with the weight of the 
nameless uncarved block. The nameless uncarved block is but freedom 
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.59
 Laozi, DDJ 3710
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from desire, and if I cease to desire and remain still, the empire will be 
at peace of its own accord.   11
Schneider quotes a remark out of its context. As this passage shows, Wu Wei literally 
is non-action, but it does not ask the ruler to not act. It enlightens the ruler not to 
foster self-demands and achieve them in governance; rather, the ruler should take care 
of the whole state, so those large-scale plans that benefit people can be achieved. It is 
a moral dimension that is accepted by Han Fei. This is also related to Han Fei’s 
understanding of human nature, because Laozi (FȆ, B.C. 571 — B.C. 471) 
emphasized the desires of human beings and discerned that desires are the roots of 
chaos. Han Fei agrees this Taoist philosophy. Also, Wu Wei is almost impossible in the 
beginning of governance. Indeed, Han Fei lists other political strategies that rulers 
should enact to create a society that is good enough to let a ruler govern through not 
acting. This is a moral idea because the ultimate goal for governing is to establish a 
society that is in order. Not acting is a general term that describes overall selfless 
governance; it is not a term that represents doing nothing. It is interesting that 
Schneider goes on to address this misreading:  
The monarch is able to remain in non-action, because the machinery of 
his state is so well constructed and maintained that it hums along and 
achieves its ends without any need for effort on his part.  12
There are very strong biases against Legalism that have existed in Chinese 
philosophy because of the largely Confucian identity of the scholars who have created 
and transmitted orthodoxies about early Chinese figures. So even though Schneider 
saw the logic of non-action, he still wanted to critique immorality and Legalism’s 
 DDJ translated by D.C Lau.11
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.412
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logical intersect. Schneider partly agrees that moral questions should not be 
considered in governance. This idea is incomplete and should also be improved; it 
should be corrected to: individual morality should not be considered in governance 
because Han Fei saw morality in an overall way instead of as a unit. This is a 
significant part of the moral dimension that should not be dismissed.  
 As with Wu Wei, the word “unreadable” is another term that has been misread 
and misused by Schneider in his study. “If he [the ruler] has any virtue at all it is the 
authority he exercises by being ‘unreadable’ i.e. incomprehensible and non-
predictable.”  This understanding is limited because these two, incomprehensible and 13
non-predictable, are only used to require rulers to mask their self-interests, because 
there exist too many examples of people around the ruler speculating about the ruler’s 
wills and cynically flattering the ruler in order to seek benefits that would nullify legal 
governance. It is immoral to let these exceptions exist in the targeted society because 
they are going to destroy the fundamental of governance, namely Rule by Law. 
Denecke offers a perfect conclusion to address Schneider’s rhetorical question, “if a 
ruler is alienated from his self-interest, why should he then use the instruments Hanfei 
proposes? ”:   
He [Han Fei] recruits the concept of “non-action” from Laozi for this 
purpose, and imagines a ruler pretending to be aloof and non-acting but 
separated from his subjects through screens of systematic deception. 
The screens protect the mystique of rulership and make necessary a 
sophisticated system of indirect communication between the ruler and 
his subjects.  14
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.513
 Wiebke Denecke, The Dynamics of Maters Literature: Early Chinese Thought from 14
Confucius to Han Feizi. p. 284
	 !  10
This is a moral idea in governance because this ruling method protects both sides of 
the court. The ruler is been protected by his apparent mystique, while subjects are 
being protected by being kept away from the ruler’s temper. Also, a ruler is 
predictable as everyone should know how he is going to act—according to law. Such 
ideas have been emphasized in the Han Feizi, and will be discussed in later chapters.  
Schneider also suggests that a Legalist ruler is illusory as he seems to have no 
real freedom or power. On the one hand, he should stay stable and not acting. On the 
other hand, he should stay isolated without any indication of his predilection. He is 
not an active and controlling executive but rather a figurehead or symbol for the 
state.  Schneider uses this interpretation to justify his statement that this form of 15
governance is immoral. His conclusion is that his characterization of Wu Wei—staying 
isolated, staying quiet without acting to govern—must lead to chaos, which is a 
disaster for the population. Moreover, such governance has been thought of as 
immoral not only by Legalists but also by other philosophers. If freedom is the state 
of being unconstrained, and if power is the ability to act as one desires, then the ideal 
Legalist ruler seems to have no real freedom or power.  This is partly correct, as 16
mentioned before. “Figurehead” is not a proper word to describe a ruler who applies 
Wu Wei governance, and Wu Wei is the ideal case after all. This statement also ignores 
those rulers whose desire is governing. At the same time, if a ruler can prevent and 
eliminate potential threats, he can express his preference, other than governing 
according to law, too. Moral thinking has been neglected in this dimension, because 
Schneider only focuses on a ruler’s behavior while ignoring the majority of 
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.515
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.516
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population. The ruler’s destiny is governing well; a ruler should apply his power to 
governing his state; it is his social role requirement, just like a chef’s duty is cook. 
This is not immoral. Requiring people to work according to rules is a moral 
dimension of Legalism. 
 Later in his paper, Schneider devotes an entire chapter to Han Fei’s problems 
regarding issues ranging from the characteristics of rulers to morality, from governing 
style to pragmatism. Schneider mentions a key idea that relates to human nature, 
which is the fundamental part of understanding ancient philosophy, especially Han 
Fei’s Legalism, so it deserves to be explained more clearly. There will an entire 
chapter later to explain and analyze Han Fei’s understanding of human nature to give 
a compelling perspective. On this issue, though, Schneider seeks to challenge Han 
Fei’s setting of human nature. It is worth pointing out that this question deserves an 
answer.  
Due to the signals and nudges a potentially absolute ruler is exposed to, 
it is even more difficult to argue that a mediocre monarch can detach 
himself from his desire.  17
According to Han Fei’s understanding of human nature, which is Utility nature (which 
will be discussed in detail later in the paper), this statement is true. It is also the 
reason why Han Fei wrote so much material to educate rulers on how to act, as well 
as warnings. When the ruler knows what outcomes will results from his behaviors, he 
will think about his behaviors before he acts. If he can afford the worst case, he can 
do whatever he wants. Contrary to Schneider’s claim, though, this kind of monarch 
cannot be thought of as a mediocre monarch; he is almost the worst case in Han Fei’s 
philosophy. There are moral dimensions in Han Fei’s understanding of human nature 
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.617
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as he always thought about the worst cases and prepared for them. Therefore, the 
worst situation can never happen. In this respect it is better than other theories that do 
not take account of unexpected cases and potential loose ends.  
According to the moral theme, a debatable question arises for Schneider. He 
asks: why does the monarch who fails in morally cultivating himself succeed in 
practically cultivating his persona?  He tries to attack Han Fei’s philosophy by using 18
a mediocre monarch as an example to show his logic: 
If the ruler is detached from whatever he likes and dislikes, if he is 
alienated from his self-interest, why should he then use the instrument 
Hanfei proposes? Or if the ruler has no reason to rule at all; why should 
he have a reason to be the ruler?  19
The logic here is not entirely convincing. But whether a person is moral or not, 
judgement is subjective. One judges others based on one’s own perspective and 
opinion of morality. Although not everyone shares the same standard of morality, 
generally moral ideas are held in common. The difference between the ruler’s 
morality and the subjects’ morality is a matter of perspective and priorities. Subjects 
only need to take care of themselves while the ruler has to consider cases integrally. 
When people think ignoring individual profit and morality is immoral, it is hard to 
persuade them to accept it is moral overall. If the ruler paid attention to individual 
morality instead of the integral one, he would lose control of the state, as plenty 
principles that are good for state cannot be implemented and, hence, disorder ensues.  
As discussed before, it is one’s social role that decides one’s duty, not others. 
One was probably born as a prince and became a ruler later. One actually has no other 
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.718
 Henrique Schneider, Where Han Fei Errs. p.819
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choice if he wants to be the ruler. Han Fei mentions several examples in his work, 
using previous experiences to convince rulers to apply his political philosophies. 
Those worst cases cautioned the ruler to pay attention to facts without Legalism. It is 
not a predilection for rulers to follow but they have to use Legalist ideas or be 
executed; this is presented not as imagination but as reality.  
The second half of the quotation has already been answered in the discussion 
of Wu Wei (above), and it is highlighted again later when stating the necessity of 
Kingship. Schneider's biased interpretation requires this paper to give clear reading 
and explanation in later chapters. As for the way Schneider’s analysis and 
conclusions, they become meaningful arguments for this paper. From human nature to 
governance philosophy, from individual desire to Way, all these contain Legalist 
morality. Using other schools’ moral dimensions to judge Legalism is circumscribed 
as their elementary understandings are different.  
2.2 Review of Winston  
 Winston effectively identifies the moral aspects of ancient Chinese Legalism. 
He adjusts and improves old interpretations of Legalism as Instrumentalism, which 
had been thought to contain zero morality.  Some Western scholars are mentioned in 20
his paper to help him state his opinion regarding the internal morality of Chinese 
Legalism.  He tries to find moral dimensions from three main aspects of Legalism—21
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 20
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.316
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 21
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.315-p.322
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Generality, Impersonality, and Authority—to elucidate the morality of Rule by Law.  22
Crucially, he adheres to the original text of the Han Feizi to portray connections 
between Rule by Law and morality in order to highlight the internal morality of 
Legalism.   23
 When we see the title of the paper—“The Internal Morality of Chinese 
Legalism”—we notice Winston’s stress on the word “Internal,” which confines him to 
explaining a dilemma: Legalism is immoral, but there are some angles from which we 
can read Legalism as moral. The title is quite misleading since morality does exist in 
ancient Chinese Legalism. Legalism’s morality does not require rhetoric to reveal it; it 
is incontrovertible. There are aspects to his approach that those who are concerned 
with issues of Legalism will find controversial. 
 To critique Instrumentalism, Winston paraphrases Han Fei’s idea of Law to 
state against immorality: 
Rule by Law meets at least one and possibly two conditions missing 
from ad hoc instrumentalism. Most importantly, the commitment to 
rules — fixed standards of general applicability — is not ad hoc; they 
are the ruler’s chosen mechanism of governance…Second, the rules 
promulgated are not necessarily intended to serve the lawmaker’s 
personal desires or ends.  24
Winston raises two points here and both of them contain moral thinking and are 
correct. The first one states one of characteristics of law: it is not ad hoc. It is an 
important aspect even in today’s legal system. Generality indicates the stability of 
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 22
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.322-p.329
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 23
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.332
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 24
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.316
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government, which further manifests in the peace of society. It is a moral dimension 
that is one characteristic of the finest Legalist society. The second part of the first 
point—the ruler’s chosen mechanism of governance—is easy to understand. If an 
instrument is not preferred by ruler, it must not be applied in the way it is designed to 
be. This does not conflict with any later idea, because policies being chosen by the 
ruler does not directly imply that the ruler is satisfying self-interest.  
Another point must be a moral thinking because it refutes some critiques. 
Some Confucian scholars, such as Confucius and Mencius, argued that Legalism is an 
instrument to satisfy the ruler’s self-interest while ignoring subjects’ lives and social 
requirements. This critique goes against those ineffable censures as it is not aimed 
only at serving the ruler. In debate of this aspect, such moral Legalism ideas have 
been neglected for years; people do not think they are moral ideas, but they are. Self-
interest mostly cannot be avoided in reality, but Han Fei’s philosophy is not proud of 
it; on the contrary, he promotes law to reduce the impact of rulers’ desires on subjects. 
Here is an exception in this philosophy: the ruler is parallel to law to certain degree. 
All subjects were monitored in that era, but the ruler, as a representative of the highest 
social class, was not restricted by any other humans. So there was the possibility that 
the ruler could dominate the system; Winston called this mode rule of law.  On the 25
other hand, in a monarch-centralized age, there existed philosophies that aimed to 
confine the most powerful Kingship; this should be thought of as moral, as Winston 
concludes convincingly.   
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 25
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.313
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 But Winston deviates from the original text and focuses on Western 
philosophies. He tries to match up others’ work in order to express his own 
understanding. He cites John Austin, Thomas Hobbes, and Lon Fuller as his three 
main instruments. Some attempts are made to compare the features of Chinese 
philosophy with parallel aspects of Western philosophy. However, the aim of such 
comparisons is to present and account for differences in the two fields as such, rather 
than to elucidate the characteristics of Chinese philosophy.  
One needs to go back only to John Austin, the influential 19th century 
English legal theorist, for systematic elaboration of rule by law.  
Western theorists, indeed, might be tempted to look at Chinese 
Legalists through the lens of Austin, since his work enables us to see a 
systematic body of thought in the Han Feizi.   26
Winston uses Austin as a tool to understand the Han Feizi. Austin’s theories provide a 
good starting point but they lead to an unexpected fact, because such a comparison is 
going to lead to sharpened analysis in some areas and distorted focus in others. Fuller 
brings in the connection between law and morality, as well as the corrective approach 
that was introduced in Winston’s paper. These attempts are used to help Winston 
represent the internal morality of Legalism. However, they are questionable, not 
because no morality exists in Legalism, but because these tools are inappropriate. To 
understand the morality of Legalism, the tool that must be applied is the Han Feizi 
itself. It is not easy to find moral dimensions when one is heavily influenced by 
exterior works.  
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 26
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.314
	 !  17
 Although Legalism’s has been criticized as immoral, the way Winston finds 
moral dimensions is probably wrong. Winston tries to use modern ideas to answer the 
question “Why govern by rules?” by:  
Considering in turn three salient attributes of law: generality, 
impersonality, and authority. Each attribute expands the scope of 
respect for the moral agency of subjects.  27
These three aspects are mentioned in the Han Feizi, but in a different way. Their 
morality will be discussed in later chapters. For now, I shall argue that they are 
misread. Rule by law contains these requirements, but it is not because of a need to 
respect the moral agency of subjects. According to Han Fei’s opinion of human 
nature,  it is impossible to agree with a saying like this. Han Fei's political 28
philosophy is a practical strategy; it is immoral to rely on illusory human morality. 
This idea can be inferred from Han Fei’s chapter on “The Five Vermin” in the original 
text. This is part of the Han Feizi, which, as Goldin points out, “expresses with utmost 
clarity its belief that every member of the elite—like any member of society—pursues 
his own interests.”  Yuri has similarly commended Legalist theorists for 29
“dismiss[ing] the possibility that the elite—rulers and ministers alike—would be able 
to overcome their selfishness.”  It is clear enough to see Han Fei's attitude about 30
human nature. So the moral dimension in this answer should be: because Han Fei 
foresees unreliable human morality, it is moral when he does not account for subjects’ 
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 27
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.322
 Utility nature, will be discussed later.28
 Goldin, Persistent Misconceptions About Chinese Legalism. P.88-10429
 Yuri, Legalism in Chinese Philosophy, 201430
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moral agencies in Legalism. Also, there are some misunderstandings in Winston's 
analysis, which misses target moral dimensions.  
A. Generality. This refers to the Generality of Law, which Winston tries to assess 
the morality of Winston’s explanation is convincing, but it is imperfect. He 
addresses the issue of the Generality of Law using our common, modern 
perspective, so his view is limited. He mentions that generality is important 
because no one can think of all possibilities and give solutions 
correspondingly. This is rational but not how Han Fei thought. Han Fei 
considered his philosophy from a top-down perspective. He did not care about 
detailed excuses; he cared about facts, so I believe if he was given a case 
mentioned by Winston,  Han Fei himself would not support Winston’s 31
interpretation. The fact in Winston’s case became a starting point for others to 
follow, although no collision happened, what if such a starting point leads to 
later death? When law is too general, there is going to be a grey area for 
subjects, which makes cases hard to judge and society hard to govern. 
Moreover, generality can be understood in another way. For instance, the law 
forbids murder, which means that one cannot kill others under any 
 280 N.Y. 124,19 N.E.2d 987 (2ND cIR. 1939). The point is illustrated by a well-31
known New York case, Tedla v. Ellman29 ('Tedla') involving pedestrians who walked 
on the right-hand side of a highway lacking side walks, contrary to an ordinance 
requiring them to walk on the left side, facing the traffic. They did so because the 
traffic on the left was very heavy at the time, whereas the traffic on the right was 
light. Thus, although walking on the wrong side (as specified in the statute), they 
were, in Judge Lehman's words, exercising "such care for [their] safety as a 
reasonably prudent person would use" and as the ordinance was intended to foster. 
It would be nonsensical, the judge argued, to believe the New York legislature 
expected the statute to be followed literally in every situation. For then the 
legislature would have decreed that pedestrians must observe a general rule 
prescribed for their safety even in circumstances where observance would subject 
them to imminent danger. It is unreasonable, Judge Lehman believed, to ascribe to 
the legislature such an intention.
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circumstances. No matter if their motivation was revenge or justice, murderers 
are going to court. Generality here does not require complete analysis; it just 
means a goal that should be strictly applied. When Winston reads it in 
consideration of moral agency of subjects, it is incorrect.  
B. Impersonality. Impersonality, mentioned in Winston’s quotation, is a moral 
dimension of Legalism that has been inferred to be self-direction. This idea is 
neutral, and Winston’s understanding makes sense. It is self-direction as the 
freedom to set and act on one’s own ends.  When law has been written and 32
published publicly, everyone knows what kind of behaviors receive rewards 
and which ones receive punishment. Then they have their rights to choose how 
to act. But this is not because Han Fei respected the moral agency of subjects; 
rather, it is the requirement he assigned to the ruler. The moral dimension is it 
requires the ruler not to exhaust subjects and to pay attention to state status in 
order to create a great state where people can talk about morality.  
C. Authority. Like Generality, Authority is another aspect that has been wrongly 
read in Winston’s study. Misinterpretations shift Legalism from moral to 
immoral. Winston uses Austin to indicate that law is a legitimate device 
among all. It is a correct idea with incomplete proof.  
Law is a device for getting people to adopt a general perspective, 
reconciling private with public purposes…government by law cannot 
take root without widespread voluntary compliance.  33
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 32
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.326
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 33
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.327
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Austin’s opinions are not incorrect, but his focus was on his contemporary 
legal system, which results in Winston deviating off course. Indeed, it is 
obvious that Han Fei did not rely on voluntary compliance, otherwise he 
would not have adopted Xunzi’s Evil nature theory. When he distrusts human 
morality, there is no reason he needs voluntary compliance to build up his 
legal system. A governance system must be immoral in general as it needs 
voluntary compliance. One may argue that it is moral because it considers 
individuals, but actually it is immoral in that circumstance. To build the 
authority of Law needs ministers and law-executors responsible for their work.  
 Winston’s paper finally comes back to the title of the Han Feizi, and tries to 
state its internal morality. However, just like has been mentioned above, he is 
influenced by others and takes unnecessary pains to study an insignificant problem 
and then miss its moral dimensions. He keeps emphasizing the morality of rulers, 
while it cannot be controlled. It is good that a ruler is moral but a moral ruler does not 
mean he is a successful ruler; Han Fei gave examples of such cases in his works. A 
successful ruler is the moral dimension in the Han Feizi, not a moral ruler.  
Winston consistently states that law serves every subject’s interest in his text, 
but this is not true. The paragraph he cites from the Han Feizi is not what Han Fei 
wanted to state; it is a misconception. This misconception leads to a wrong conclusion 
that law is a guidance for subjects. If this is what Han Fei had wanted to say, then he 
would have agreed with Xunzi’s idea that education is the most important thing in 
governance. This opinion had already been denied by Han Fei. Practically, law with 
reward and punishment is more useful than education depends on human nature, 
	 !  21
which is born in a love of profit and a hatred of harm. It is moral to the majority when 
good people are rewarded and evil people suffer punishment.  
 Because of his resourceful materials, and because of his ambivalent opinion 
about morality in Legalism, some of his proof goes against his former analysis. For 
example, Winston suggests that Han Fei was against Confucian virtue. Winston 
implies that Han Fei’s philosophy is immoral when he raises this dimension: 
Recognizing the ill effects of the supposed monopoly on virtue, the 
Han Feizi rejects the need for Confucian worthies as intermediaries 
between ruler and subjects and advises the ruler to issue public rules 
accessible to all.  34
This contrasts strongly with the previous perspective and weakens his argument. 
There is nothing wrong about virtue, but Han Fei did not rely on it and he did not 
want people focusing on such ideal morality while neglecting legal orders, taking no 
notice of individual virtue is moral for the entire society. That is the reason why he 
raised the “Five Vermin.”  
  
2.3 Conclusion 
 In both Schneider’s and Winston’s accounts, there are plenty of interesting 
ideas to be discussed. They are going to lead and enrich this thesi. I suggest that, to 
discern the morality of the Han Feizi, we need to study according to the original text 
and to understand it in context. Analyzing Legalism from our modern perspective 
misconstrues Han Fei’s philosophy and neglects the moral dimensions of it in the time 
and place in which it was conceived. 
 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism. Singapore Journal of 34
Legal Studies, (December 2005), p.333
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CHAPTER 3 
LI RITUAL VS. FA LAW  35
It is important to know Han Fei’s philosophy about human nature in order to 
understand the morality in his philosophy. Han Fei was a student of Xunzi, so it is a 
good method to discover Legalism’s morality through comparing the works of the 
teacher and the student. Xunzi is associated with two famous standpoints: a belief in 
an essentially evil human nature, and a belief in the importance of ritual (li ). One 
cannot deny that Han Fei was intensely influenced by his teacher, as human nature in 
his understanding is even worse than in Xunzi’s view. Han Fei refined previous 
Legalists’ fa  system according to his knowledge. Both the ritual system and the fa 
system tread different paths that lead to the same destination. The purpose of both is 
to organize hierarchical classes and promote the stable development of society. They 
are the same kind of tool, but fa is more radical and practical, which means it fits the 
age much better. To analyze the morality of Legalism, we have to firstly discuss Han 
Fei’s understanding of human nature, then talk about his ideal society before we move 
to the final step. 
3.1 Xunzi’s perspective 
 Xunzi (Ǹ#, B.C. 313ȏB.C. 238) argues that human nature is evil. In his 
understanding, people are born evil; this is a predestined nature that can never be 
changed. 
 fa 法 will be kept, it is not going to be translated into Law. Because fa raised by 35
Han Fei is a combination of several principles instead of a singular symbol. 
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 AlöȐtĞ¤ƕȎ  36
 Human nature is evil; any good in humans is acquired by conscious 
exertion.  37
“Acquired by conscious exertion” means it is not natural, it is artificial. It does not 
indicate direction of positive or negative; it is a neutral phrase. Actions can be 
determined to be right or wrong but learning ability cannot. This idea differs from 
previous Confucians who advocated that human nature is good. Mencius (Ʒ#, Ʒȁ, 
B.C. 372 - B.C. 289) is an expert in promoting good nature: 
Ʒ#ǫȑPE6"S|wȐ6"S
ėȓlAĞȐƆPA
Ȏ6ĞȐP6Ȏ:īPȐǍBƬAȐ
ȉȒôBLAȐ§ȎǊPAlǟȓt½ÿ<ȎA
ĞȐtlŮƆȎ  38
Mencius said, “It is true that water makes no distinction between east 
and west, but does it make no distinction between up and down? The 
good disposition of human nature is like water’s tendency to flow 
down. There are no men who are not innately good, just as there is no 
water that does not flow down. Now, by splashing you can make water 
leap up higher than your forehead, and by churning it you can make it 
flow up a hill, but how could this be the nature of water? It is merely a 
 Xunzi, Evil Nature 性恶. Xunzi Yizhu, 荀子译注36
 John Knoblock, Man’s Nature Is Evil, Xunzi, p. 74137
 Mencius, Gaozi Shang 告子上, Mencius.38
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result of force. The fact that men can be made to act badly merely 
shows that human nature is like this as well.”   39
In this interpretation, human nature is an inborn characteristic; or, at least, humans are 
good at the beginning. It is not people’s fault when they do evil deeds because they 
are forced to be changed by circumstances.  
Xunzi’s idea is not that extreme, and he inherited the idea that human nature 
can be fixed. It is closer to the Legalist idea. He then talks about the necessity of 
education, which leads to the concept of ritual, which will be discussed shortly. In his 
view, no one is good when they are born, unless they are educated, then they know 
how to pretend properly in each situation. Xunzi’s idea is opposite to Mencius’s. 
Mencius idea is that good nature can be changed into bad while Xunzi’s idea is that 
evil nature can be changed seemingly into good. As Knoblock translated this pattern 
in his work into “conscious exertion,”  people’s exertions belie their inborn nature. 40
For example, after being educated, people know they have to show respect to rulers, 
to ministers, to seniors. Although their respect might not sincere, at least they perform 
like it is.  
Xunzi provides more examples to prove his theory and make the connection to 
ritual. 
:AlȐBÂǩȐĆȐÐĜƠBƹ1Ƅǩ; BƟ
öǩȐĆȐÐŝƪBƦEƄǩ;BĹÄAőȐy
ǩȐĆȐÐǛ÷BčOhƄǩȎ<ÿpAlȐĆA
 Translated by D.C Lau, Mencius. 39
 John Knoblock, Man’s Nature Is Evil, Xunzi, p. 741.40
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Now, the nature of man is such that he is born with a love of profit. 
Following this nature will cause its aggressiveness and greedy 
tendencies to grow and courtesy and deference to disappear. Humans 
are born with feelings of envy and hatred. Indulging these feelings 
causes violence and crime to develop and loyalty and trustworthiness 
to perish. Man is born possessing the desires of the ears and eyes 
(which are fond of sounds and colors). Indulging these desires causes 
dissolute and wanton behavior to result and ritual and moral principles, 
precepts of good form, and the natural order of reason to perish.  
This being the case, when each person follows his inborn nature and 
indulges his natural inclinations, aggressiveness and greed are certain 
to develop. This is accompanied by violation of social class distinctions 
and throws the natural order into anarchy, resulting in a cruel tyranny. 
Thus, it is necessary that man’s nature undergo the transforming 
influence of a teacher and the midweek and that he can be guided by 
ritual and moral principles. Only after this has been accomplished do 
courtesy and deference develop. Unite these qualities with precepts of 
good form and reason, and the result is an age of orderly government. 
If we consider the implications of these facts, it is plain that human 
 Xunzi, Evil Nature 性恶. Xunzi Yizhu, 荀子译注41
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nature is evil and that any good in humans is acquired by conscious 
exertion.    42
Xunzi is clear here that the desires he mentions in his examples are inborn. Besides 
people with disabilities, everyone can see and hear. The nature of jealousy and 
pursuing profit are, in this interpretation, ramifications of biological ability. Living 
alone, people will not know other’s profit so they will neither pursue profit nor be 
jealous of others. But nobody would break such biological ability on purpose, so they 
need an exterior force to help them correct their attitudes and actions. This force is 
called ritual (li).   
3.2 What is li?  
Xunzi outlines his principles in his Theory of Ritual: 
BőȐőBȐÿ6ȎB6"~Ȑÿ
ĜȒĜÿ÷Ȑ÷ÿůȎÆúöt÷ȐÐč%"AȐ%×
AőȐ9AȎőºůėȐºƁSőȎD¤k
BYȐAZ!ȎÐ¤×Ȏ  43
Men are born with desires which, if not satisfied, cannot but lead men 
to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires men 
observe no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would 
be impossible for them not to contend over the means to satisfy their 
desires. Such contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. 
 John Knoblock, Man’s Nature Is Evil, Xunzi, p. 741.42
 Xunzi, Theory of Ritual 礼论. Xunzi Yizhu, 荀子译注43
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The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder; so they established the 
regulations contained within ritual and moral principles in order to 
apportion things, to nurture the desires of men, and to supply the means 
for their satisfaction. They so fashioned their regulations that desires 
should not want for the things which satisfy them and goods would not 
be exhausted by the desires. In this way the two of them, desires and 
goods, sustained each other over the course of time. This is the origin 
of ritual principles. Thus, the meaning of ritual is to nurture.   44
Ritual is firstly raised by Xunzi so that his explanation is an official clarification. The 
prominence of ritual in his argument clearly indicates Xunzi’s view of society at that 
time.  
He offers an explanation of why chaos happens. It is because there are not 
enough resources to satisfy human desires. If the relation between supply and demand 
stays stable, there will not be any chaos, but during the Warring States period, such a 
relationship broke up. Hence, Xunzi suggests ritual is just a tool that should be 
applied in governance by the ruler to avoid chaos. At first, it educates humans to limit 
their lust and satisfies some of reasonable desires. However, the success of ritual 
relies to a large extent on humans’ morality. If subjects defy the education of ritual, 
they are immoral, but it seems there is no corresponding response to them. It is not a 
compulsory principle, and it does not possess legal effectiveness. If the ritual system 
is accepted by rulers and they accordingly formulate punishment for it, then it 
becomes fa, which is critiqued by Xunzi.  
 John Knoblock, Discourse on Ritual Principles, Xunzi, p. 60144
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 Xunzi himself considers ritual to be a moral idea that differs from fa. He 
indicates that ritual is the best of all available political strategies:  
Ƣ¤ȐƤśƻBúȐsµBſȐÂǔBĿȐįƲŴ
ƐƊĒBƄȎ  45
A lord of men who exalts ritual principles and honors worthy men will 
become a True King; one who stresses law and loves the people will 
become lord-protector; one who is fond of profit and is much given to 
dissimulation will be imperiled; and one who schemes after power, 
plots revolution, and risks secret intrigues will perish.  46
In his decreasing ranking, we can see ritual is the best and the finest law is second. He 
is still a master of Confucianism in balance, even though his idea contrasts with 
Mencius’s conception of human nature. Xunzi believes that human being possess and 
inner morality and this is why he praises ritual so much.  
Legalism is not entirely belittled by Xunzi, but some aspects are. The Lord of 
Shang’s (èȀ, B.C. 390 - B.C. 338) law is the reason why he lists fa at the second 
position on his list, as performance of fa is very close to his ritual. However, two 
other key aspects of Legalism—Shu Ă and Shi ½—are belittled. Although he does 
not match up descriptions and nouns, we can see Shu and Shi occasionally fit the 
 Xunzi, Qiang Guo 强国, Xunzi Yizhu, 荀子译注45
 John Knoblock, On Strengthening the State, Xunzi, p.501 46
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other two in Xunzi’s decreasing ranking.  Shu sits in profit and dissimulation while 47
Shi sits in schemes after power, plots revolution, and risks secret intrigues. Both Shu 
and Shi are political strategies that were promoted by Legalists, and they are going to 
be discussed below when talking about Han Fei’s development.  
3.3 How does Han Fei critique ritual?  
 One way ritual differs from fa is that ritual distinguishes humans into classes 
while fa does not. Such class distinction is not a marginal part of Xunzi’s philosophy. 
It is a core part of his concept of ritual.  
ǖēė	#ȐBýēSƧǞȐ7áíīȐZ%cś¤5śȐƞ
¤5ƞȐŒ¤ćȐŒ¤Ȏ  48
Performance of sacrifice at the Suburban Altar stops with the Son of 
Heaven. Performance of sacrifice at the Altar of the Soil stops with the 
feudal lords. But the sacrifice at the end of mourning extends even to 
the knights and grand officers. These serve to distinguish between the 
noble who should serve the noble and the base who should serve the 
base, between the greatness of those who should be great and the 
smallness of those who should be small.   49
 Shu is advocated by Shen Buhai 申不害, it is an instrument that allows rulers 47
distinct good or bad of his ministers and correspondingly use strategies to control 
them. Shi is advocated by Shen Dao 慎到, it is an instrument required rulers to 
maintain and handle by themselves, like momentum, it helps rulers issue orders and 
force subjects to achieve goals. 
 Xunzi, Theory of Ritual 礼论. Xunzi Yizhu, 荀子译注48
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A surface moral ritual contains such an immoral hierarchy in Xunzi’s philosophy. 
Although Han Fei’s Legalism is by no means egalitarianism, it nevertheless offers a 
more even circumstance for subjects to gain their reputation and profit.  
 Another point of fundamental difference between Li and fa is in the idea of 
lineage. In this context, this is nothing to do with blood lineage, but perspective 
lineage. They sharply contrast with each other as Li requires people to respect and 
learn from forefathers, while fa does not and indeed sometimes ignores these elders.  
īǈǫȑ“ø:Ŋ-ȐtZ%İ÷¤Ŋ7Ȏ”……Ð%Ȑ
%--Ȑ%āāȐ%·Ȑ%7ÚÝȐø:……Ŕß
ÆúȐĆčȐŋAƼßȒĈǆȐƢ#qȎ  50
Fools say: the circumstance of the past and the present are quite 
different, and the Way by which to bring order to the anarchy of today 
must be different…Hence, the sage use men to measure men, 
circumstances to gauge circumstances, each class of thing to measure 
that class, the persuasion to measure the achievement, and the Way to 
observe the totality, so that for him the ancient and modern are one and 
the same…Every doctrine that is neither consistent with Ancient Kings 
nor in accord with the requirement of ritual and moral principles is 
properly described as a “treacherous doctrine.” Although they may be 
the product of a discrimination, the gentlemen will not heed it.  51
 Xunzi, Fei Xiang 非相. Xunzi Yizhu, 荀子译注50
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Here, Xunzi states an arbitrary judgement that a doctrine has to follow either an 
Ancient King’s path, or ritual and moral. It may seem that Xunzi implies that if the 
governance is accorded to ritual and moral, it is doctrine—but actually he does not. 
He still refers it back to the King, who stands on the top of the hierarchical system, 
because to be a true King, one needs to exalt ritual principles and honor worthy men. 
Although in ancient China the King always represents authority, Legalism’s fa 
somehow sets the standards for the King and eschews blind worship. This perspective 
is going to be discussed in later chapters.  
3.4 Han Fei’s perspective 
 Absorbing Xunzi’s idea of “Artificial” human nature, Han Fei developed it 
into “Utility” human nature. In this conception of human nature, people are flexible 
according to different circumstances. Without restriction, people express their inborn 
love of profit and put it into practice. If, however, there is an exterior force responding 
to and penalizing people’s behaviors, people’s actions become bounded and controlled 
spontaneously.  
Han Fei concurs that people chasing profit to enjoy themselves as it is an 
inborn characteristic.  
 ÂöÞȐīAZ  52
 Love benefit and hate harm, it is human’s inherent characteristic.  53
Similar with Xunzi’s view, this characteristic is nothing to do with evil and morality; 
it is instinct. However, eschewing Xunzi’s conception of ritual, which educates 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 37, Nan Er 难二, Han Feizi52
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humans to limit their desires themselves, Han Fei thought human nature could not be 
fundamentally altered or ameliorated. Forcing people to change is just like stopping 
people from eating food when they are hungry; it is thought of as immoral. So, it is 
immoral to educate humans in order to impose restrictions on them. However, that 
does not mean rulers should always let subjects behave freely. “Utility” human nature, 
which entails loving benefit and hating harm, gave Han Fei inspiration of the tool that 
was designed to be used in governance, in dealing out rewards and punishments. He 
then adopts previous Legalists’ advantages and corrects disadvantages according to 
Xunzi’s criticism and historical experiences to establish an integrated Law system. 
The new system contains clear instructions of how to shape subjects’ behaviors, how 
to govern states, and how to maintain Kingship. 
 Han Fei’s observation and perspective has been supported by several famous 
scholars, such as Guo Moruo:  
Han Feizi was an outstandingly intelligent person, with an 
extraordinarily sharp brain, sometimes so sharp and trenchant as to scar 
us. Just read pieces such as “Difficulties of Persuasion” or “Difficulties 
with Words”: how precise is his psychological analysis of the way of 
human affairs!!  5455
 Determination of evil and moral is subjective; it depends on people’s own 
standpoint. Han Fei accepted Xunzi’s determination that doing whatever to chase 
profit is evil with his own improvement. This understanding affected Han Fei’s 
thinking and evolved his governance philosophy. His Legalism ignored satisfying 
current individual desire that is chased by the majority; instead, it decided to sacrifice 
 Guo Moruo, Xian Qin xueshuo shulin, 31254
 Translated by Wiebke Denecke, The Dynamics of Maters Literature: Early Chinese 55
Thought from Confucius to Han Feizi, 283
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immediate fame and aimed to reach morality in the long term. That is to say, the 
intention was to establish an overall moral society in order to satisfy individual 
morality by rigorous implemented principles. For instance, when a thief has been 
caught, he would be educated in the school of Confucianism in order to let him be a 
better human. This is moral to the thief because he sacrifices nothing, while it is 
probably immoral from the perspective of the one who has been stolen from. From the 
Legalists’ perspective, the thief would be punished according to law, and his 
punishment would depend on his behaviors and values of the good. He might sacrifice 
his life to pay back what he did. This is moral to the majority as he and other thieves 
are cautioned, which reduces the potential possibility of larceny. When all these 
wrong behaviors been eliminated, subjects do not need to worry about domestic 
threatens. This is the morality that people looked for and it is the result which Han Fei 
tried to achieve. However, people have to sacrifice their feelings at the beginning of 
this kind of governance because it contravenes people’s preceding custom.   
 In the chapter on “Five Vermin” in the Han Feizi, Han Fei raises typical cases 
in order to critique five different kinds of vermin—as he terms them—in society. He 
uses metaphor to indicate that Confucians, politicians, swordsmen, businessmen, and 
idleness are vermin. He cites living examples to show his attitude towards the five 
vermin and to highlight how these vermin are harming society. Accordingly, he 
proposes solutions to reduce their threats. This clearly expresses his perspective on 
social history and political philosophy. Besides his agreement with Xunzi’s 
perspective of human nature, Han Fei also expresses his opinion against ritual in the 
chapter on the five vermin. He does not directly argue the weakness of ritual, but his 
perspective indicates ritual’s weakness. 
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īø:ŊƈȐÐŊØȐCő%ňźAąȍİľiAµȐƆ6ȅ
ťBǀȕÙȐ@AŰȎ  56
Past and present have different customs; new and old adopt different 
measures. To try to use the ways of a generous and lenient government 
to rule the people of a critical age is like trying to drive a runaway 
horse without using reins or whip.  57
Recall Xunzi’s view on this topic: “Fools say: the circumstance of the past and the 
present are quite different, and the Way by which to bring order to the anarchy of 
today must be different…” Han Fei argued for this idea. Both of them are correct in 
this case. In the fools’ statement, when we read 7 as methods, it is foolish. But when 
we read it as Way, Xunzi is correct. Although different schools offer different Ways in 
their philosophies, the greatest Way of governance is always the same. All schools 
want peace and development. Of the two explanations, Han Fei’s idea is more actual 
and pellucid than Xunzi’s. It requires the government to observe, think over, and 
apply principles according to circumstances. Moreover, Han Fei’s fa is fairer; it 
eliminates hierarchy in subjects, and means that all labors are set by law.  
 In the following case given by Han Fei in his chapter, he restates that the 
insistency of human nature coincides the useless of Confucian education. Moreover, 
he emphasizes the importance of law and punishment.  
:HA#ȐŀĐĺAǭ¿ȐūȊAǭ>ȐY©Aǭ
uȎī%ŀĐAȐūALȐYAÜȐ42^ǩȐB¥
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi56
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. p.10257
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>tǼïȐ¿ȒàAǴȐłÈŧȍgeBřƼȐ</
ŘƙȐut°Ȑ¨tLǺȎÐŀĐAã%©#Ȑº¶àA
ļƺ¤ȐµŵƗSȍqSŅǺȎ  58
Now there is a young man of bad character. His parents rail at him but 
he does not reform; the neighbors scold but he is unmoved; his teachers 
instruct him but he refuses to change his ways. Thus, although three 
fine influences are brought to her on him — the love of his parents, the 
efforts of the neighbors, the wisdom of his teachers — yet he remains 
unmoved and refuses to change so much as a hair on his shin. But let 
the local magistrate send out the government soldiers to enforce the 
law and search for evildoers, and then he is filled with terror, reforms 
his conduct, and changes his way. Thus the love of parents is not 
enough to make children learn what is right, but must be backed up by 
the strict penalties of the local officials; for people by nature grow 
proud on love, but they listen to authority.   59
In this case, we can see the man with bad character had been educated for several 
times by different people—parents, neighbors, and teachers. Neighbors represent the 
atmosphere, which is an important factor in Confucianism. Parents and teachers are 
two powerful identities that are endorsed in Confucianism. However, none of their 
words were able to exert an unconditional controlling force; whether their attempts at 
education work or not all depends on the receiver’s responses. Inversely, law makes it 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi58
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. p.10459
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easy to manage. Humans’ hatred of harm—their “Utility” nature—encourages them to 
think about their behaviors when they are going to face punishment. It is more moral 
to apply strict law when compared with Confucianism’s system of governing, because 
in the latter there are too many unstable variables and it is impossible to let Confucian 
teachers try infinite times to alter wrongdoers.   
3.5 Han Fei’s eclecticism 
 Han Fei, as the most successful Legalist, absorbs advantages from other 
philosophers who do not necessarily come from the Legalist tradition. No matter if 
they are Taoist or Confucian, what matters is that Han Fei deems the ideas to be 
practical and useful.  
 As outlined above, Han Fei asserts Xunzi’s perspective about human nature 
and develops it into “Utility” human nature. Based on this Utility nature, he uses the 
Taoist idea Wu Wei to state his own understanding of governance and morality.  
MƢ6S
ȐăǕȇƙėȎMƢA7ȐÜ¤ÝtŨȐBƢ
_%û5ȐÐƢůSÜȒƻ¤ȃtńȐƢ_B¬AȐÐƢů
SȒ·ÿƢtƻȐÿǕ¬tŪȐÐƢůS[ȎÐ
ƻBƻ¤ȐÜBÜ¤mȎǕtŖȐƢt+·Ȑ
AŋƻKAJȎ  60
The enlightened ruler practices non-action above, while his officials 
tremble with fear below. The Way of the enlightened ruler causes the 
wise to exert their wits, while the ruler, relying on them for his 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 5, Zhu Dao 主道, Han Feizi60
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decisions, does not exhaust his wisdom. He makes the worthies apply 
their talents, while the ruler, employing them I that basis, does not 
exhaust his own abilities. In the event of success, the ruler gains worth; 
in the event of failure, the ruler blames the crime on his officials, so 
that he never risks his reputation. Indeed, even if unworthy, he will be 
the master of the worthies; even if unwise, he will be the corrector of 
the wise subjects. The officials are put to hard work, while the ruler 
gains from their success. This called the “Canon of the Worthy 
Ruler.”  61
Other reasons, such as protection for both sides and keeping a well-organized state 
working fluently, have been explained in the previous chapter, but here I outline 
another perspective on Han Fei’s reading of Taoist Wu Wei. Han Fei distinguishes the 
ruler and his subjects, including officials who were also subjects of the ruler. If the 
ruler feigns an absence of desires instead of preferences and feigns ignorance instead 
of wisdom, subjects will be more genuine and transparent in their reactions. This is 
not a process of inner transformation within one practitioner of the Way, but a 
unilateral game between the ruler and subjects that produces the illusion of balance 
and should ultimately bring about the working of a self-regulating state.  Within the 62
school of Legalism, Han Fei borrows and revises the Lord of Shang’s law as brace in 
his philosophy, and he clearly sees that farming and war are methods that must be 
applied to strengthen the state. He mixes the Lord of Shang’s law, Shen Buhai’s (B.C. 
 Wiebke Denecke, The Dynamics of Maters Literature: Early Chinese Thought from 61
Confucius to Han Feizi. p. 287
 Wiebke Denecke, The Dynamics of Maters Literature: Early Chinese Thought from 62
Confucius to Han Feizi. p. 287
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385 - B.C. 337) Shu, and Shen Dao’s (B.C. 395 - B.C. 315) Shi together, thus 
constructing a brand new instrument.  
 Linking Shi with Shen Dao and Shu with Shen Buhai does not mean they only 
pay attention to one aspect, but means they have their own achievements regarding 
these aspects. Shen Buhai emphasizes Shu, which is governing skill. He argues what 
has been admired by Confucianism—self morality and accordingly presents his 
opinion: 
 AȐBAEȐÿŌǺȎ  63
If one cannot solve one’s problem by making proper use of technique, 
but seeks instead to solve it by merely believing what he is told by 
others, he is certain to end in confusion.   64
 Shu here is an interchangeable character, it refers to Ă Shu (i.e., skill), so it clearly 
states that all methods that apply to officials are Shu. They are appointment and 
dismissal, supervision, examination, and reward and punishment. Shen Buhai distrusts 
individual morality, he would rather trust his Shu to get the answer he wants. 
 Shen Dao emphasizes Shi. It is hard to find an accurate translation 
corresponding to it but here are two examples that afford a sense of its meaning.  
ïȋȍwŲȐ	A¼ǶȎ­A%ÕȌȐÿd¤ƚNȒ¨A%
ȔȐÿL¤ƚēȎ¾ÚAȐÿȔyAîȐǶ¤ƹAȐÿ
yĭǺ……ÐŚƭ{ƥȐ¡ĄƅçȐçƉƥǿȐaǲǱVȐÿ
tZƅȎÐƻBƁSǗ¤Ȑį²ȒǗBSƻ¤Ȑś
 Shenzi, Shenzi, 申子辑注 Shenzi Jizhu.63
 Creel, Shen Pu-hai, p. 38064
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ȎǳưīȐtƩ(Ȏ¼ÀTBúȐÿĥLżēȎ¾
ÚAȐƻã%ǗȐB½ã%ƁƻǺȎÐ6[Bû¤Ȑį
sȎ   65
Maoqiang and Xishi were the most beautiful women in the world, but 
if they were to wear hideous masks, then everyone who saw them 
would flee. Yet if they were to change and wear fine materials, then 
people in the street would all stop and stare at them. Looking at it from 
this viewpoint, then, fine materials assist in beauty. If beautiful women 
decline them, then their beauty will be obscured……So the winged 
snake travels on the mists, and the flying dragon rides the clouds. But 
when the clouds are gone and mists dissipate, then they become the 
same as worms, because they have lost that upon which they were 
riding. Therefore, if worthies yield to an unworthy, this is because their 
authority is too light. If unworthies submit to a worthy, it is because his 
status is respected. When Yao was a commoner, he could not bring 
order to neighboring families, while when Jie was the son of heaven, 
he was able to bring disorder to all under heaven. Looking at it from 
this viewpoint, being worthy is not sufficient to make the masses bow 
down, but positional power and status are sufficient to make worthies 
bend. So, those who are not renowned but still decide matters are able 
to do so because their authority is weighty.  66
 Shenzi, 慎子 Wei De威德, Shenzi. 65
 Harris, The Shenzi Fragments, p.10766
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Shi in political philosophy is like momentum in dynamics: it helps people to foster 
larger energy. Subjects do not require momentum to move, but when they have 
momentum, they can move faster and more easily. So, in Han Fei’s philosophy, Shi is 
required and must be handled by the ruler. At the same time, the ruler could not let 
others create similar Shi. It is a moral consideration because it protects Kingship in 
that age when monarchy is the only system of governance.  
 Within Han Fei’s Fa system, these three aspects—fa, Shu, and Shi, all link 
with one another. The reason Han Fei is the most successful Legalist is because he 
combines them well. He proposes that none of them is more important than any other; 
they all need to be taken into consideration. He writes: 
½ÿİȐæ½ÿ÷Ȏ  ÐĞ¬½¤&oȐ@_t½67
¤&ĿȎ  K¤łĂȐÿŅ½²BǕǁ[Ȏ  68 69
If they uphold the law and make use of their august position, order 
obtains; if they discard the law and desert their august position, chaos 
prevails.  Therefore, who can hold his angst position skillfully, finds 70
his state in safety; who does not know how to utilize his august 
position, finds his state in danger.  If the lord of men does not apply 71
 Han Feizi, Chapter 40, Nan Shi 难势, Han Feizi.67
 Han Feizi, Chapter 14, Jian Jie Shi Chen 奸劫弑臣, Han Feizi.68
 Han Feizi, Chapter 35, Wai Chu Shuo You Xia 外储说右下, Han Feizi.69
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 204-20570
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 1/p. 12271
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tact, his prestige and position will become insignificant and ministers 
will celebrate themselves at leisure.  72
All three aspects—Fa, Shu, and Shi—are mentioned through the Han Feizi. It 
is hard to decide which one takes a great portion. But when the ruler applies all three, 
his authority maintains; his power is handled by himself and not by others who may 
take charge of the state and create chaos, and his state stays in peace. This can be 
thought of as moral because this instrument protects Rule by Law. To caution the ruler 
to apply all three aspects together without preference, Han Fei mentions well-known 
Legalists and uses their failure as warnings. The Lord of Shang’s failure is because he 
violated nobilities’ priority and nobody sustained him. It is immoral when there is 
someone trying to establish impartial order to help majority be killed; not only 
immoral to such people, but also immoral to majorities. Shen Dao paid more attention 
to creating and fostering circumstances while ignoring what humans can do in state. 
Shen Buhai paid more attention to governing skills.   
:ŬÞßĂȐBeƋȀȎĂ¤Ȑ_¬BƑÈȐƒ[Bķ
]ȐłĢAǬȐäăǕA¤ȐKAZŐȎ¤Ȑǧ
ĥ SÈŏȐƺƣºSµȐŢëėƯȐBƣ^ėƼĥ¤Ȑ
ǕAZȎƢ6ĂÿǤS
ȐǕ6ÿ÷SȐ 
6ȐƚűúAìȎ  73
Now Shen Pu-hai speaks of method but Lord of Shang deals in laws. 
Method is bestowing office suiting assignments to qualifications, 
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 13472
 Han Feizi, Chapter 43, Ding Fa 定法, Han Feizi.73
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making responsible for the object as laid down by the name, holding 
fast to the Handles which deal death or life, and testing the abilities of 
all the ministers. These are in the hands of the ruler. Law is having the 
statutes publicly available in the government offices, punishments 
which the people know for certain will be applied, rewards given 
consistently for punctiliousness in the law, and punishments imposed 
consistently on violators of the decrees. These are what the subjects 
take as their exemplars. Without method for the ruler there are abuses 
up above, without law for the subject there is disorder down below. 
Neither is dispensable, both are tools for emperor or king.   74
Han Fei argues that Shen Buhai’s failure is because of his ignorance of unifying laws. 
Meanwhile, the Lord of Shang’s failure is because he lacked methods (Shu) to control 
and to hold the court.  
 So, Han Fei combines all of Shen Dao’s Shi, Lord of Shang’s Fa, and Shen 
Buhai’s Shu, to let the different perspectives eliminate each other’s weaknesses. He 
sets up a strip of defense to protect majorities and law-executors. Instead of teaching, 
his fa represents an easier and more effective way to lead people. It is immoral to let 
humans set self-restriction. So, Han Fei’s thought of governance, reducing moral 
pressure for humans, and telling subjects what they should not do, became moral in 
realistic operation. 
3.6 Macro morality 
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 21274
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 Setting up abundant confines does not mean Han Fei’s philosophy contains 
zero morality. Contrary to this apparent prejudice, it breeds morality in a macro sense. 
Most scholars of Legalism doubt the morality of Han Fei’s Legalism. They can raise 
multiple living examples to assert that Legalism is immoral. Those examples are not 
deniable, but they are neglectable. Because Han Fei never thought about benevolence 
in political games, he gave counter examples, which will be discussed in latter 
chapter. The most significant morality of Legalism is in its concern for macro rather 
than micro reality.  
ŻAİµȐSRȐptőȐSÂµBXȎÐtaAƺȐ
»Z%öµȐARȎ  75
When the sage brings order to the people, he measures by the most 
basic; he does not indulge their desires, he simply looks ahead for what 
will benefit the people. Therefore when he imposes punishments on 
them, it is not out of hatred of the people, it is basic to his concern for 
them.  76
This statement is not difficult to understand. In chaos, subjects’ basic requests must be 
for peace and stability; it cannot be sexual desire, nor financial gain, nor lust for 
power. But the base of all those is a powerful state, so that ruler must release some 
principles and force the people to do them accordingly. Everyone works as a piece to 
run the state as a machine and then they can have their peace. Physical pain and blood 
are sacrifice to their age. It is moral and it is the largest morality. Acknowledging this 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 54, Xin Du 心度, Han Feizi.75
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 32676
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precondition can help us better understand Han Fei’s arguments and philosophies. 
Another point that has been discussed in previous chapters is that Han Fei’s sought to 
build the state first and then consider morality later, not the other way around. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STANDARD OF GOOD SOCIETY IN LEGALISM 
 Technically speaking, all schools during the late Warring States period looked 
for an ideal society that was way better than the states’ status at that time. However, 
they raised their governing principles based on different understandings of human 
nature, which led to different theories. Many people did philosophy in order to find a 
perfect model for that ideal society. Many examples can be raised to endorse this 
statement, but as the main resource of this paper is the Han Feizi, here I will only cite 
materials related to Han Fei’s education to highlight the influences of him and 
changes he made. 
 Confucius’s ideal society is a hierarchical Great Harmony. Hierarchical 
thinking exists everywhere in Confucianism and it is one part of Confucian thought. 
At the same time, moral thinking tends to be considered in positive aspect so that 
individual morality been considered in governance. Some political strategies rely on 
officers’ morality and the stability of the society relies on subjects’. 
 &ƢƾÊȐīAȎīƾÊȐíAȎǵȐƺ

īȎ  77
Where the ruler of a state lays hold of the cross-bar, and bends forward 
to it, a great officer will descend from his carriage. Where a great 
officer lays bold of the bar and bends forward, another officer will 
 Confucius, Qu Li 曲礼, Li Ji 礼记.77
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descend. The rules of ceremony do not go down to the common people. 
The penal statutes do not go up to great officers.  78
This states the idea of a hierarchical system that should work in an ideal society 
according to Confucius. We can see the difference between this and Han Fei’s ideal 
model. This is more old-fashioned and decayed. Relying on individual morality plays 
an important role in Confucianism. It is a wonderful ideal society raised by Confucian 
but it is also illusory.  
 ÐƲũBùȐơǘ÷ƪBWȐÐÍBũȐŋVȎ   79
 In this way (selfish) schemings were repressed and found no 
development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors did not show 
themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not 
shut. This was (the period of) what we call the Grand Union.   80
Confucius uses examples to describe a peaceful society. Behind appearance, it means 
people are well educated so that they know what they should and should not do. At 
the same time, they are satisfied. There is no need to get extra profit through illegal 
moves. But the most important thing for the society is, Confucius believed, individual 
morality. All those performances rely on the morality of every single person in 
society. 
 Although both Confucius and Mencius were erudite Confucian scholars, their 
views differed. Mencius’s ideal society is people-weighted hierarchical society. 
 James Legge, Qu Li I, The Book Of Rites 礼记, 2016. 78
 Confucius, Li Yun 礼论, 礼记 Li Ji. 79
 James Legge, Qu Li I, The Book Of Rites 礼记, 2016. 80
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Mencius highlighted the importance of subjects, and in his statement, seemed to 
reduce amount of subjects classes.  
 µĦȐýǹ?AȐƢ²Ȏ  81
 The people are the most precious of all things. Next come the gods of 
soil and grain. The sovereign matters least.  82
This statement raises a popular opinion in governance, but it is ambivalent because, 
no matter what Mencius asserts, it is impossible to change the era’s characteristic: 
monarchy. If the King considers everything before considering himself, it heavily 
relies on self-morality. Governance relies on self-morality has been proved 
continually wrong and immoral. 
 Xunzi is another Confucian scholar, but his perspective of society differs from 
previous ones. Xunzi’s ideal society is a well-educated, principled, hierarchical 
society.  
 tŶ¤QŤȐt«íonȐt®ǴȐtŇǙƤȐtǢkË
ĠȐİ&XȎ   83
 When its plowmen take pleasure in the fields, when its fighting knights 
are comfortable with adversity, when its minor officials are devoted to 
law, when its court exalts ritual principles, when its high-ranking 
ministers harmoniously engage in deliberations —— this state is 
definitely well governed.  84
 Mencius, Jin Xin 尽心, Mencius.81
 Hinton, To Fathom the Mind, Mencius, p.26182
 Xunzi, Fu Guo 富国, Xunzi.83
 John Knoblock, On Enriching the State, Xunzi, p.30184
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“Educated” means the society applies Li: people are taught to balance their demands 
so that they are satisfied in their fields. “Principled” refers to Law, as is already 
mentioned in Xunzi’s statement. Law here is principles, not the one which describes 
Legalism.  
 Han Fei does not directly given his model in his works, but his theory of state 
governance indicates the hidden template. It largely overlooks personal morality, 
which has, according to his view, been proved untenable in governance. Instead, Han 
Fei’s model it relies on the strict application of Legalist ideas, or to build a Legalist 
country that can feedback what has been requested by the majority of population. It 
contains the following three aspects: 
I. A monarch-centralized bureaucratic state. This characteristic is the basis of an 
ideal society. 
II. The nature of citizenship. Following on from Xunzi’s conception of “evil” human 
nature, Han Fei sets a boundary that contains all acceptable subjects, whereby 
anyone or anything not in the boundary should be controlled or even eliminated. 
III.Clear, stable, and practical law. Laws work as reasonable warnings; subjects have 
to be notified of their roles and of the outcomes that follow from defying the law. 
These aspects will be developed in more detail in the following. 
4.1 Monarch-centralized bureaucratic state 
 First of all, it is worth analyzing the two key words—Centralized and 
Bureaucratic—separately. Monarchy must lead to centralization, and it becomes an 
autocratic centralized system. It was the only governing system at that time in ancient 
China and all over the world. Bureaucratism was a regime prevalent in ancient eras. 
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All considerations and plans were under this circumstance. All schools’ efforts—of 
Legalism, Confucianism, and Taoism—were to establish a united state as well as to 
end chaos after hundreds of years of warfare. This is a macro-scale moral raised and 
practiced by sages at that time. Han Fei advocates the establishment of a monarch-
centralized bureaucratic state. To support this argument, he combines historical 
examples and observations of situations in his era.  
 In the Ai Chen Ǖ chapter in the Han Feizi, he introduced his thinking 
regarding the governing regime:  
Ǐ¤ǽAƄȐAƞȐƚpƧǞA. Ȏ 85
Of old, the ruin of Chow and the fall of Chou were both due to the 
territorial expansion of the feudal lords.   86
Every autocratic dynasty was initially monarch-centralized, but the Zhou dynasty 
promoted bureaucratism, whose original goal was reward. Nevertheless, it finally 
decreased the ruler’s authority and later destroyed centralization. Separating rights to 
dukes inevitably leads to such destiny, according to the “evil” human nature 
perspective, because humans’ desires can never be satisfied, so that the dukes always 
want more. To address this problem, which periodically repeats itself through history, 
Han Fei re-raises a method: monarch-centralization. A ruler holding all powers 
himself stops himself from being destroyed from within or defeated by relatives. At 
 Han Feizi 4, Ai Chen 爱臣 chapter. Chapter title can not translate to Love 85
Ministers, indeed, it is a chapter that cautions ruler ways which should be avoided 
when he reward ministers. 
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 1/p. 2986
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the same time, the ruler can set up development and defense processes from the 
overall situation.  
Han Fei began his philosophizing from the point of view of the good of the 
state, rather than the interests of the individuals who might happen to live in or desire 
to move to their ideal states.  This probably is the main aspect that has been critiqued 87
most strongly. There is no need to say, as we have discussed above, that Han Fei’s 
intention was moral, the same as others’, to build a united state and end chaos. 
4.2 The nature of citizenship 
 The ruler cannot be the only human in the state. He needs his subjects—
including ministers, business people, teachers, etc.—to play an important role in the 
state. But good and bad are intermingled. A good society should only consist of good 
subjects, and these good subjects should function as the backbone of the society. It is 
impossible to wipe out all negative factors; shadows always exist if there is light. 
With this in mind, Han Fei mentions several specific points in his work in order to 
caution rulers to pay attention to those people who might not be stable factors. In Han 
Fei’s view, such people should either be controlled or reduced to maintain a good 
society.   88
 Philip J. Ivanhoe, Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation. Journal of Chinese 87
Philosophy 38:1 (March 2011) 31-45, at 32
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, mentioned in Han Fez’s perspective chapter, 88
Han Fei talked about five kinds of injurious vermin, they are scholars especially 
Confucian, Political Strategists, swordsmen, military escapee, and business men. I 
conclude them into three species. Idleness and military escapee are been combined as 
both of them are looking for benefit without hard working. Confucian and Political 
strategists are combined as both of their words are powerful and they also disdain 
laboring.  
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 Han Fei identifies groups and individuals who should not be included in the 
model of an ideal society. Firstly, there should not be subjects who only focus on 
individual morality rather than overall morality. Han Fei raises examples of 
Confucianism and previous dukes who emphasized an individual’s morality to present 
that it is infeasible and it negates governing.  
:;¤AKȐƅºħA½ȐBåLƘčÿ%úȐ
KAºáǃġȐB%iAŔµƚCéƓȐºAȎ  89
Nowadays, when scholars counsel a ruler, they do not urge him to 
wield authority, which is the certain way to success, but instead insist 
that he must practice benevolence and righteousness before he can 
become a true king. This is, in effect, to demand that the ruler rise to 
the level of Confucius, and that all the ordinary people of the time be 
like Confucius’ disciples. Such a policy is bound to fail.  90
Han Fei emphasizes this point strongly. In Han Fei’s time, most people were not well 
educated and the reality was that subjects could never get the same amount of 
information as higher-level people could. Subjects, due to their limited view, focused 
on themselves and were easily influenced. That is the fundamental perception of 
human nature by Han Fei. During this time, there were famous scholars who 
encouraged moral governance, which negated Rule by Law and could, moreover, 
foster negative attitudes toward government. David K. Schneider expresses his 
opinion in his article:  
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi89
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. p.103-10490
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They [chief among the five vermin] are insidious in that they 
introduced a multiplicity of subversive ideas into political discourse 
and promoted the notion that the path to social advancement is through 
the clever use of arguments. They incited rebellion and undermined the 
ruler’s ability to maintain single-minded devotion to the state and to 
productive work that advances its interests.   91
Furthermore, these kinds of people were definitely not praised by Han Fei because 
they worked on debating instead of laboring, while laboring is another key aspect 
praised by Han Fei and will be discussed later. Han Fei thinks a society filled with 
these kinds of people is a dangerous initiator of revolt, so these people should be 
banned.  
The second group of subjects who should not be included in the ideal society, 
according to Han Fei, are those who gain profits without doing practical things that 
benefit the state. With the development of the society, there are more kinds of posts, 
but people should always work on basics to build up the state. 
 5IB­¹ÿŋAȐ«·BśÿŋAƻȐƻAL+Bŧ
ŃB)ƝǺȎKƻALȐBÃŧŃ)ƝAƨȐÿţLâB
eÂƇǺȎ  92
Likewise, he who manages to get clothing and food without working 
for them is called an able man, and he who wins esteem without having 
achieved any merit in battle is called a worthy man. But the deeds of 
such able and worthy men actually weaken the army and bring waste to 
the land. If the ruler rejoices in the deeds of such men, and forgets the 
harm they do by weakening the army and bringing waste to the land, 
 David. K Schneider. China’s New Legalism. 91
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi92
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then private interests will prevail and public profit will come to 
naught.  93
We are not going to discuss the ruler’s role in such cases in this chapter (I will come 
back to this topic Section 5). Most people are looking for such private profit without 
having to work hard; this is human nature. Reasonable human nature does not mean it 
is good for the state. Rewards should only be given when subjects achieve the 
required target. Han Fei does not mention what kinds of careers were his targets, but 
we can see clearly he agreed with the Lord of Shang’s thought on farming and war.  94
ŔKAZ%Ǆµ¤ȐÈǝȒ&AZ%ù¤Ȑŗ«Ȏ:µ
ÈǝȐƚ%ŗ«ȐB%Ŝßŉ7ȐŋŖµȎŖµ¤Ȑt&º
6IȎ6I¤Ȑt&ºǓȎ   95
The means, whereby a ruler of men encourage the people, are office 
and rank; the means, whereby a country is made prosperous, are 
agriculture and war. Now those, who seek office and rank, never do so 
by means of agriculture and war, but by artful words and empty 
doctrines. That is called ‘wearying the people.’ The country of those, 
who weary their people, will certainly have no strength, and the 
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. p.10593
 Lord of Shang, farming and war 农战. Lord of Shang thought ways that can 94
strengthen the state are farming and military. State’s and subjects’ profit are all come 
from these two element. So ruler should reduce other paths to gain rewards in order to  
force subjects focus on farming and wars. Other paths include literatures and trades, 
which attract subjects chasing private profit and opportunities to avoid physical 
hardworking. This idea has been proved by reality, Qin applied this idea and finally 
strengthen its power.  
 Lord of Shang, Chapter 3 Agriculture and War, The Book of Lord of Shang. 95
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country of those, who have no strength, will certainly be 
dismembered.  96
This is stated by Lord of Shang. Compare this with Han Fei’s previous critique about 
people who do not do laboring. It is clear both these Legalists express the same idea. 
Smart people are usually not used to doing basic labor; they look further and are 
arrogant. They try to raise abstract viewpoints to distinguish themselves from 
ordinary subjects. These smart people are hard to control, so they become unstable 
factors in a state. At the same time, these people usually refuse to go to war, which is 
valued by Han Fei. They would rather play diplomatic strategies, but diplomatic 
strategies are belittled by Han Fei, who believes that if a state relies on diplomacy 
instead of farming and wars, it cannot protect itself when surrounded by external 
threats. Therefore, sages can be used if they obey orders; otherwise, rulers should give 
them up and not rely on them to develop states. One drop of poison infects the whole 
tun of wine, and when people see others gain rewards without working hard even 
once, they are likely to imitate this themselves next time. These people are like dead 
seeds: they grab and absorb others’ resources and produce nothing. Although these 
people have their abilities to interest rulers, probably through flattery or appearance, 
and because of their ability and capital, they nevertheless should not exist in 
Legalism’s ideal society as conceptualized by Han Fei.  
 There are other examples given by Han Fei to describe the influences and 
serious consequences of those unhelpful scholars and diplomatic strategies: 
 Duyvendak, The book of Lord of Shang, p.18596
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King Yan of Xu lived east of the Han River in a territory five hundred 
li square. He practiced benevolence and righteousness, the thirty-six 
states came with gifts of territory to pay him tribute, until King Wen of 
Jing, fearing for his own safety, called out his troops, attacked Xu, and 
wiped it out. Thus King Wen practiced benevolence and righteousness 
and became ruler of the world, but King Yan practiced benevolence 
and righteousness and destroyed his state. This is because benevolence 
and righteousness served for ancient times, but no longer serve today. 
So I say that circumstances differ with the age……Qi was once 
planning an attack on Lu. Lu dispatched Zigong to dissuade the men of 
Qi, but they replied, “Your word are eloquent enough. But what we 
want is territory, and that is the one thing you have not mentioned.” So 
in the end Qi called out its troops, attacked Lu, and fixed its boundary 
line only ten li away from the Lu capital gate. King Yan practiced 
benevolence and righteousness and the state of Xu was wiped out; 
Zigong employed eloquence and wisdom and Lu lost territory. So it is 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi97
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obvious that benevolence, righteousness, and wisdom are not the 
means by which to maintain the state.  98
King Yan of Xu, influenced by the moral considerations of individuals, overlooked 
the physical strength of the state. His limited perspective contributed to the weakening 
of the state and its military. Therefore, when he faced forceful threats, his state had no 
power to defeat the enemy, and his allies who respected him were not reliable. Human 
nature has already decided humans’ actions: they only chase profit, not credit or 
brotherhood. Similarly, the Duke of Lu trusted diplomats. When he faced threats, his 
first choice was not preparing his army to protect his state. Instead, he assigned 
diplomats to negotiate deals with the enemy. This is not to say moral considerations 
have no value or logic, but thinking about morality in such a situation was an 
irresponsible move. This is because of the influence of both debating people and the 
“dead seeds.” 
 There is a third group of subjects who should be considered with caution when 
it comes to constructing the ideal society, according to Han Fei. People with extreme 
talent in any field could stay in the state but they should be under control and should 
not be hired in important roles. Human nature dictates that most subjects are indolent; 
they would rather rely on their advantages and stay in their comfort zone. However, 
no one is a well-rounded contributor to society, even as a ruler, and those people with 
talents can use their advantages to seek loopholes that will lead to social disorder.  
Ǩ%O÷Ȑƍ%ĵŁżȐBKƛAȐZ%÷Ȏīª
¤ŪȐBƧÆ%O;vȒŁż¤ǷȐBăƍ%ţę×ȎÐA
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. p.10098
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The Confucians with their learning bring confusion to the law; the 
knights with their military prowess violate the prohibitions. Yet the 
ruler treats both groups with respect, and so we have disorder. People 
who deviate from the law should be treated as criminals, and yet the 
scholars actually attain posts in the government because of their 
literary accomplishments. People who violate the prohibitions ought to 
be punished, and yet the bands of knights are able to make a living by 
wielding their swords in a private cause. Hence, those whom the law 
condemns, the ruler accepts, and those whom the magistrates seek to 
punish, the higher officials patronize. Thus law and practice, high 
official and lowly magistrate, are all set at odds, and there is no fixed 
standard. Under such circumstances even ten Yellow Emperors could 
not bring the state to order.  100
Han Fei suggests that when people are considered wise, it can because they use 
abstruse language. Beautiful language is attractive and it has the ability to deviate 
from the correct path to stable governance at the same time. Han Fei cites other, 
similar cases, such as the swordsmen (as distinct from generals, who were good at 
martial arts because they were under management). The swordsmen discussed in this 
context were out of control, according to Han Fei. Most of them were good at martial 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi99
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. P.106100
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arts and they did not behave according to principles; instead, they acted freely based 
on their judgement. There were too many examples of these people relying on their 
ability to kill and to rob. They explained their arbitrary behaviors as justice č yi. 
Some kills might have been because of revenge, and some robberies might have been 
pursuits of illicit money. All these crude actions are banned in Han Fei’s society. 
When others break law, they should be punished, but they should not be punished by 
someone who is not government officer. In Han Fei’s opinion, when these talented 
subjects exist in a state, whether intriguing speakers or impressive martial artists, they 
must be in charge. They must be removed if necessary, as otherwise they will be an 
unstable element of society.  
 Han Fei’s position on this issue seems immoral and even cruel to these people 
who have been mentioned, as they do not have their positions in society, but it is 
moral to majorities who seek stable lives and their corresponding rewards. 
Furthermore, this focus on removing the elements that might unsettle a society is, to 
some extent, the precondition of a good society as outlined by Han Fei, whose focus 
is on the morality of the entire country.  
 ¤ȐǋAȄȎKþ ȄAµȐ×ǦšAíȐÿ}
ĈģƄA&ȐǓƇAŇȐŮƃĖǺȎ  101
These five groups are the vermin of the state. If the rulers do not wipe 
out such vermin, and in their place encourage men of integrity and 
public spirit, then they should not be surprised, when they look about 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi101
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the area within the four seas, to see states perish and ruling houses 
wane and die.   102
It is not strange to see the decline of states when the five vermin exist. The 
preponderance of these vermin is a sufficient and unnecessary condition of frustrated 
governing. So, trying to reduce the number of subjects in these categories is not 
immoral, as it maintains the stability of the state and protects the majority of subjects.  
4.3 Clear, stable, and practical law, and rigorous guardianship 
 To eliminate randomly chosen subjects is immoral because it largely would be 
innocent subjects. Thus, a well-organized state needs a standard by which it decides 
and judges who needs to be punished. Clearly promulgated and stable law, and a team 
that executes the law, are another two factors in Han Fei’s ideal society. Law can 
protect the majority’s profit and justice. Promulgated law works as a warning: it 
warns subjects according to principles that have been written by committees who are 
responsible for the law and who have demonstrated themselves to be smarter than 
regular people. The most important factor is that they represent the subjects, not the 
ruler. 
MKA&Ȑĥ¤ȍß$Ħ¤Ȑ¤ȍ5$Û¤Ȏß6fĦȐ
DÛȐÐßLBƶSĥ¤ºżȎ  103
In the state of an enlightened sovereign, his orders are the most 
precious among the words of men and his laws are the most 
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. p.118102
 Han Feizi, Chapter 41, Wen Bian 问辩, Han Feizi103
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appreciated rules of affairs. Two different words cannot be equally 
precious nor can two different laws be equally appropriate. Therefore, 
words and deeds not conforming to laws and decrees must be 
forbidden.  104
As has been mentioned, during the time of Han Fei’s writing, monarch centralization 
was the basic principle, so it is understandable that the ruler’s order is the highest 
priority; this cannot be thought of as immoral when understood in context. Except 
orders from the ruler, the law should be sacrosanct. Laws that are not easily changed 
means a stable society, as subjects will be satisfied and less likely to rebel. Law would 
be promulgated on behalf of justice. Without law, people judge cases based on their 
experience and interests in contrast to principles.  
However, only having law means nothing. Law should be strictly enforced 
with rewards and punishment. In the “Two Handles” chapter,  Han Fei outlines a 105
moral argument that the ruler should hold the power of reward and punishment 
himself, in case these two handles were been controlled by others to satisfy their self-
interest. When implementing this suggestion, the ruler needs to avoid his preference 
and should distinguish subjects’ fame and blame. Promulgated law is not opposite to 
the Two Handles idea. However, the ruler cannot do every detailed thing himself; he 
needs his ministers to help him with governing the state. He lends his power to 
ministers who can be responsible for examining specific subjects and who must do so 
according to law rather than self-interest. The ruler should then examine these 
ministers according to law too. 
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 207104
 Han Feizi, Chapter 7, Er Bing 二柄, Han Feizi.105
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 This chapter has analyzed what kind of society Han Fei looks for by 
examining the principles contained in his text. To conclude, it is a monarch-
centralized country whose ruler eliminates his self-interest and behaves mostly 
according to law. Under his government, there are ministers who fulfill their assigned 
positions and who must be examined by the ruler according to law. In Han Fei’s ideal 
society, law has been promulgated clearly and publicly, so that everyone knows what 
kind of behaviors win rewards and what kind of behaviors receive punishment. In 
other words, subjects are shaped by principles. Moreover, there are several groups of 
subjects who should be strictly limited as some of them have strong influences on 
others, some of them have additional powers compared to common people, and some 
of them play words games instead of doing the hard work that is required by a rapidly 
developing state. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MORALITY IN FA: MORAL RULE BY LAW 
 Rule by Law is the basic principle raised by Legalists. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Legalism advocates and practically supports monarch-
centralization, but establishing another opposite power limits the monarch’s authority 
to a certain degree. Why must there be another power against the King? Is it because 
of morality or humans’ self-interest? Careful examination of the original purpose of 
the Legalists’ emphasis on Rule by Law shows that its function is a moral one. The 
intention is to limit Kingship in order to reduce rulers’ emotional orders and to correct 
divergent government.  
5.1 Why Rule by Law? 
 To talk about morality in Rule by Law, we have to firstly know the necessity 
of the existence of it. As has been mentioned, there are possibilities that the ruler is 
not ruled by law in reality because it is the character of the age. But beyond that 
character, Rule by Law is the case promoted by Han Fei. Rule by Law is a 
standardized tool that was created by sages and advocated by Legalists to work 
against as well as to restrict Kingship. At the very beginning of human history, there 
was no law; people did whatever they wanted to do based on their natural sense and 
ancestors’ experience. As we all know, human beings are social animals, so separated 
subjects would automatically live together and then become a tribe. In the process of 
evolution, some people who had power and made contributions to the tribe would get 
more rights and be followed by others. This was the initiation of Kingship and 
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leadership. With the development of society, leadership finally became Kingship in 
organizing and governance.  106
 Kingship cannot appear alone, it appears with a King and his subjects, it 
appears with an aim that is maintaining society’s stability—at least most rulers would 
make this goal their first priority. As the state expands, Kingship expands. A King 
needs more rights to protect, to build, and to develop the state. The strengthening of 
Kingship will definitely foster the abuse of authority. Han Fei especially trusts the 
notion of evil human nature lRö. It is a good thing for him because he can then 
easily propose political strategies that are correct, useful, and attractive to the ruler. It 
is also a good thing for the ruler because he uses Legalism’s ideas to dominate the 
state, shaping subjects’ behaviors through administering rewards and punishment. It 
was impossible to believe every ruler was a sage. It was also impossible to eliminate 
rulers, not individuals but such a position, because Kingship was representative of 
bureaucratic regime, and it was effective in governance. Such an idea was not only 
supported by Han Fei, but also by other Legalists. For example, Han Fei states in the 
“Nan Yi” chapter in the Han Feizi:   107
The state without the King cannot be governed.  
&6Ƣ%İhȎ 
According to the Lord of Shang:  108
 There is a long paragraph that discusses this evolution process which proved this 106
explanation in dredge obstruct 开塞 in Lord of Shang. The original passage and 
translation would be given in index.
 Han Feizi, Chapter 36, Nan Yi 难一, Han Feizi107
 Lord of Shang, Dredge Obstruct 开塞. This chapter talks about political obstructs 108
at that time and accordingly with suggestions. 
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When officials were instituted but not unified, this was unacceptable; 
hence, they established the ruler.   109
The Han Feizi asserts that a state needs a ruler. The Lord of Shang gave the reason 
why Legalists need a ruler, because a ruler is one who can unite all official labors and 
makes the state work as an entirety. If the state is going to break up without a ruler, 
with a ruler there is the possibility that the ruler is not a fool. Hence, although some 
rulers may abuse their authority to satisfy their own will, rulers are rulers. Compared 
with no-ruler chaos, which hurts subjects, a Kingship limited by law is already moral 
because it reduces the possibility that the ruler will casually use his authority to 
satisfy his self-interest, which might not be good for subjects. 
 Even though Legalists’ writings may be read as endorsements of Kingship, 
they are not. Rule by Law is a powerful tool created by Legalists to restrict Kingship. 
As stated above, there did exist rulers who were not responsible in their role; they 
abused rights. Confucians advocate selecting a sage to be the ruler Żú to protect the 
correctness of rights, which means everything depends on the morality of the ruler. 
That is immoral, because nobody can guarantee the ruler is moral. That is also one of 
the reasons why Winston thinks the morality of ancient Chinese Legalism was an 
enlightened ruler, or a sage.   110
Han Fei notices the ponderance of Rule by Law: 
ƻ¤,½ÿ	İ, Ǘ¤,½ÿ	÷Ȏ  111
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If worthies use position (shi), the world becomes orderly; if unworthy 
persons use it, the world becomes chaotic.   112
This is a caution of Kingship; Han Fei clearly sees potential danger. To obstruct this 
threat, he dedicates himself to developing Rule by Law. A similar idea is raised by 
Han Fei’s predecessor Shenzi Ư#: 
Ðâ	#%	Ȑ»â	%	#Ȏâ&Ƣ%&, »â
&%ƢȎ   113
So, the position of emperor was established in order to serve the 
empire; the empire was not established in order to serve the emperor. 
The position of lord was established in order to serve the state; the state 
was not established in order to serve the lord.  114
Slave relation between ruler and state is clear according to text. It is now not wise to 
criticize ancient Chinese Legalism for being autocratic because of these famous 
Legalists’ attitude. If we say abusing authority to satisfy one’s own will instead of 
considering subjects’ profit and lives is immoral, it is undebatable to say such a tool 
aimed to prevent immorality is moral. 
5.2 How to Rule by Law  
 One may argue that the original purpose of leadership was leading the tribe to 
hunt, to fight, to develop, and to multiply. However, with the development of human 
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 201112
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society, the function of leadership changes; candidates can not only have physical 
advantages, but must also have outstanding abilities to organize and govern. These 
candidates are likely to become Kings later, but because of their distinctive abilities 
and their fame, they might be influenced by thrones. Legalists foresee such facts 
based on their understanding of evil nature, so they promote Rule by Law to prevent 
negative endings and protect subjects. However, that is not saying Rule by Law is a 
perfect tool. Some Western scholars attack the weakness of Rule by Law, including 
Winston who admits there is internal morality in ancient Chinese Legalism. They 
thought, due to the fact that rulers also had rights to legislate, they could insert their 
wills into law so that when subjects, ministers, and the society operated according to 
law, they were satisfied. Therefore, Rule by Law was still an instrument to promote 
the ruler’s interests, which means autocracy, which indicates immorality.  
This interpretation is debatable, however. The relationship between law shapes 
Kingship or King influences law is a dilemma to be explained through logic, just like 
in the famous “which came first, the chicken or the egg” question. If everything 
operates according to law, Rule by Law is undefeated, even if it faces Kingship. 
Suppose an enlightened ruler who was objective and responsible; he should govern 
the state according to law, and act as assigned. Legalists such as Guanzi and indeed 
Han Fei do not assign rulers extra free power:  
ƢǕ
ȍĦŸƚpȐŋİȎ  115116
From ruler to minister, from royals to civilian, they all obey law, this is 
called the greatest government. 
 Guanzi, 管子, Vol 15, chapter 45 Ren Fa 任法, Guanzi115
 Guanzi, 管夷吾 723 B.C - 645 B.C.116
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Hence, for correcting the fault of superiors, chastising the misdeeds of 
subordinates, restoring order, exposing error, checking excess, 
remedying evil, and unifying the standards of the people, nothing can 
compare to law.  118
Both of them show their ideal philosophy, that is the ruler is not someone who is 
extremely free. Rather, the ruler is also a subject under law, and part of the overall 
system. Although the reality is the ruler’s orders are sometimes beyond law, Legalists 
suggest the ruler should also act according to law. Interesting things happen then. As 
Legalists limit the opportunities to establish new law, law should be more continuous 
and stable ĽCBŵ.  After all, if possible, this ruler got the rights to legislate, 119
an enlightened ruler must make an excellent law that means the next ruler satisfied 
several principles. Because in the ideal model, people are elected according to 
principles. And the next generation would continue to construct a perfect society, and 
within that cyclic group, the society would go forward.  
However, there are always unexpected situations, and there are multiple 
historical examples scattered throughout the Han Feizi that unequivocally 
demonstrate how devastating the ruler’s ineptitude could be.  Legalists also provide 120
solutions to these groups of rulers. Most Legalists want the ruler to scrutinize 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 6, You Du 有度, Han Feizi117
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everything carefully, to let capable ministers decide practical matters, and to be as 
prudent as possible.  Han Fei gives further caution in his chapter: “Ministers Apt to 121
Betray, Molest, and Murder the Ruler.”  Han Fei worries about the stability of 122
Kingship and tries to provide as many instruments as he can to protect the 
conspicuous target. If, under well-managed instructions, the ruler is still too callow to 
rule the state and gets overthrown, that means he is not the chosen one who can be the 
ruler. This is the morality of Rule by Law in this direction.  
 If we go backwards, the first law must be published by an enlightened ruler; 
however, Legalists do not respect ancestors: 
%ŻñøȐȐ³iA5Ȑ_AØȎ  123
For the sage does not try to practice the ways of antiquity or to abide by 
a fixed standard, but examines the affairs of the age and takes what 
precautions are necessary.  124
This sentence highlights another characteristic of Legalism: flexibility. A ruler should 
not always follow ancestors’ examples; rather, a ruler should follow his own 
 Yuri, Legalism in Chinese Philosophy. 2014121
 Ministers Apt to Betray, Molest, And Murder the Ruler 奸劫弑臣. In the chapter, 122
Time and again he warns the ruler that nobody can be trusted: the ruler’s wife, his 
beloved concubine, his eldest son and heir—all hope for his premature death because 
this may secure their position. Threats come also from the ruler’s brothers and 
cousins, from uncles and bedfellows, from dwarfs and clowns who entertain him, 
from dancers in his court; and, of course from the talkative “men-of-service” (shi) 
who conspire with foreign powers to imperil his state. Every single person around the 
throne should be suspected; and minimal negligence can cost a ruler his life and his 
power. And the most dangerous foes are precisely those whom other thinkers 
considered the ruler’s friends and teachers, namely his closest aides, his ministers. 
——Yuri
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi123
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judgement of cases or rely on someone else who has been shown to be trustworthy. 
Then, some rulers are enabled to make new law.  
 But at the same time, although Legalism advocates dispelling wisdom Ü, 
lawmakers were those who needed to use brain due to individual limitations:  
ĎīĩBÜǎȐǎħĩȐÜã%Ě@ȐÐ_%İ
Ȏ  125
 As the few are no match for the many, the ruler alone is not sufficient 
to know all the officials. Therefore, govern men with men.  126
This idea is not isolated. It relates to several aspects of Han Fei’s philosophy, the most 
obvious of which is the idea of human resource. There is a chapter in the Han Feizi 
called “How To Use Men,” in which Han Fei states several principles of assignments. 
When laboring, the ruler should consider subjects’ talents and weaknesses objectively 
and assign to them the correct positions. The ruler should manage them according to 
law, not his mind. Promotion should depend only on one’s achievement. Finally, 
rewards and punishments should be used to manage them.  
So, in the legal case, law is not made by the ruler himself; instead, law is made 
by a council who are talented in law and responsible for Rule by Law. According to 
Han Fei’s instruction:  
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Nan San 难三, Han Feizi125
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 183126
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İ&AǕȐÌ·S&%ǠȐdSÈ%zĮȐÝISįƔ%¬
5ȎǕƚŒtȐħtÈȐ²t¬ȐBĽĊȈISȐĽĶƛ
ÈAķSƢȎ  127
Ministers of an orderly state render meritorious services to the country 
so as to fulfill their official duties, manifest their talents in office so as 
to obtain promotions, and devote their strength to the observance of 
yard and weight so as to manage affairs. As all officials have due 
abilities, are competent for their duties, and do not covet any additional 
post; and as they have no ulterior motive in mind and shift no 
responsibility of any of their additional offices to the ruler.  128
This is moral because those people were erudite in the field and they have been 
examined. It is way better than to randomly choose people who do not know anything 
about law.  
 Although reality is not like what Legalists supposed, it seems not the typical 
Rule by Law raised by Western scholars. It is not Legalism's fault because of its good 
propose and ambition. All schools during that time were ideal, the Rule by Law 
imagined by Legalism can be thought of as moral. 
 Legalists do not need an extremely smart ruler to govern states; this ruler only 
needs to follow instructions written by Han Fei in order to organize a state and protect 
himself. But anti gentleman is not anti villain. If there was a ruler who was evil and 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 27, Yong Ren 用人 , Han Feizi127
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. p. 269128
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foolish, ignored law and acted recklessly, he would be overturned by his subjects. 
There is nothing Legalism can do about this issue; that is not immoral of Legalism. 
5.3 Morality of Rule by Law 
 Some scholars have argued that there is no consideration of morality in the 
Han Feizi. Although Han Fei learnt from Xunzi whose idea about human nature is 
negative, he does not say there are no moral people. All conclusions about immorality 
were inferred. Actually, in his study, moral aspects are mentioned; he would not admit 
he himself is an immoral person. The reason why he was not looking for morality is 
because virtue was hard to reach and apply in that era. He gave up searching for virtue 
and tried, instead, to build a state that had the potential to foster morality and virtue in 
the future. This is his morality, even though it has long been misunderstood.  
 This interpretation is supported by key passages from Han Fei’s writings:   
īŻAİ&ȐǮAƱĞȐB,t»ȎǮA
ƱĞȐĉ8Ȓ,»Ȑ&şȎİ¤,
ĩBĨǎȐÐåċBåȎ  129
When a sage rules the state, he does not depend on people’s doing good 
of themselves; he sees to it that they are not allowed to do what is bad. 
If he depends on people’s doing good of themselves, then within his 
borders he can count less than ten instances of success. But if he sees 
to it that they are not allowed to do what is bad, then the whole state 
can be brought to a uniform level of order. Those who rule must 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 50, Xian Xue 显学, Han Feizi129
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employ measures that will be effective with the majority and discard 
those that will be effective with only a few. Therefore they devote 
themselves not to virtue but to law.   130
This paragraph aimed to persuade rulers to emphasize fa instead of de. While we can 
clearly see Han Fei writes ĉ8 to express the unreliable of relying on 
individual morality. Han Fei did not say there is no morality in times but only talked 
about such people as representing a distcint minority. When governing a state, using 
nice people is always better than using evil people. But when a ruler has to use evil 
people in his government, he should know how to make them obey orders, and Han 
Fei gave a solution: fa.  
 There is a saying: “because of rulers’ not relying on morality of subjects in 
governance, the conclusion of teach of morality is negative.”  This opinion is 131
definitely limited and inaccurate. As has been mentioned above, when a ruler has no 
choice but to hire someone in his government, he would logically prefer to get nice 
people with kindness and morality. But the reality is the opposite; the ruler has to use 
fa to manage them as there are few people with good characteristics. Another piece of 
evidence that can support this perspective is the “Jie Lao” chapter in the Han Feizi. 
As I have shown, Han Fei takes a dim view of human nature; however, he is still 
looking for people with good characteristics. He comments on Laozi’s work of Virtue 
(de ċ) and benevolence (Ren Ƙ) in his text:  132
 Burton Watson, Han Feizi basic writings. P.126130
 Wang Zhantong, Qin’s death is not Legalism’s fault.131
 Han Feizi, Chapter 20, Jie Lao 解老, Han Feizi In Jie Lao 解老 chapter, Han Fei 132
cited Laozi’s words and use them to represent his understanding of Laozi’s work in 
order to show his politic philosophy. 
	 !  73
ċÿ6ċȐċÿċȎÐǫȑ“
ċċȐ%ċȎ” 
This kind of virtue will be non-virtue. Conversely, non-virtue will 
again have virtue. Thus Laozi says, “Highest virtue is not virtuous; 
therefore it truly has virtue.”  133
Ƙ¤ȐŋtŠ<ȎtUAȐBöAƨȎ
AZXȐ»t¸ȎÐǫȑ“
ƘAB6%
Ȏ” 
Benevolence means joyfully loving others from one’s innermost heart, 
rejoicing in their good fortune and hating it when they run into 
misfortune. It stems from the heart’s sense of necessity and does not 
demand ant reward in turn. Thus Laozi says: “Highest benevolence 
acts, but has nothing to act out.”  134
Han Fei borrows Laozi’s work to express his own standards for these virtues. Both 
virtue (de) and benevolence should be spontaneous and unconsciously influenced 
instead of intentional. He continues to look for kind people and that is why he sets up 
his standards of virtues. If people judge that Legalism’s education neglected morality 
based on Han Fei’s rule of law, this judgement must be restricted. Using fa is not 
because Legalists disdain morality but because of the reality they have observed: 
moral people are the minority. Rule of law works in the worst case (i.e., when all 
subjects are immoral), and it absolutely works in better cases.  
 Wiebke Denecke, The Dynamics of Maters Literature: Early Chinese Thought 133
from Confucius to Han Feizi. p. 290
 Wiebke Denecke, The Dynamics of Maters Literature: Early Chinese Thought 134
from Confucius to Han Feizi. p. 292
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 On the contrary, Confucianism has always been thought of as a moral 
philosophy. From Confucius to Mencius to Xunzi, they always advocate the morality 
of human beings, suggest Rule by King, and against Rule by Law. However, the most 
successful Legalist, Han Fei, was a student of Xunzi. As my interpretation of Han 
Fei’s work has shown, he absorbed advantages from Confucianism and extended them 
as well. There are some aspects similar with each other and some are different. For 
example: 
ÐƼßȐƼȐƼ5ȐƼȐǯœÓƜAµȐĮB©AȐĳB¶
AȐǂA%ĕŢȐǐA%ƺƣȎoĮÿǡȐoĮÿğȎ  135
Hence even persons of dissolute doctrines, dissolute theories, dissolute 
undertakings, and dissolute abilities who turn away in evasion of their 
duties and twist around to shirk their responsibilities should be 
entrusted with office, instructed in its duties and their improvement 
awaited for a short time. Encourage them with commendations and 
rewards; chastise them with rebukes and punishments. If they perform 
their responsibilities with ease, they should be supported; if they do 
not, they should be discarded.  136
Does this passage look familiar? This paragraph is written by Xunzi, and it almost 
expresses the same idea as that in “The Two Handles” that is discussed above. The 
ruler handles the powers of reward and punishment, and correspondingly rewards and 
punish subjects. The difference is that Han Fei adds a condition of reward and 
 Xunzi, Rule of King 王制, Xunzi.135
 John Knoblock, On the Regulation of a King, Xunzi, p.209136
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punishment, according to Law. If one says such a Confucian idea is moral while the 
Legalist idea is immoral, that is to say, Law is immoral. Graham has critiqued the 
morality of this idea because of his view that “The Two Handles” just takes advantage 
of humans’ character: “The Legalist orders the state not by moral appeals but by 
fitting the ‘Two Handles’, reward and punishment, to the likes and dislikes which 
belong to man’s ch’ing, what he essentially is.”  This argument is controversial 137
because it can be applied on Confucianism as well. The imitation could be: “The 
Confucian orders the state not via impartially promulgated principles but by fitting 
moralities, virtue, and benevolence to characters which belong to man’s ch’ing, what 
he essentially is.” It is unfair to critique a philosophy that is practical without shifting 
humans’ inborn characteristics.  
 The final goal of governance is establishing a state favorable to people. To cite 
Han Fei’s view, it is the highest kindness 
ƘAB6%. Legalist governance 
bore prejudice to achieve its morality without concrete benevolence. The idea of Rule 
by Law is not immoral especially in the context of its development, in the Warring 
States period. It was a product of its age and expresses morality to fit in that age. It 
has long been wrong for people to research and judge Legalism’s morality by picking 
it out and putting it in the present. Surprisingly, Han Fei foresaw this situation: %
ŻñøȐȐ³iA5Ȑ_AØȎ  138
 To conclude this chapter in a short sentence, fa is moral. The age required 
rulers and assigned them supreme power to govern the state, while fa is a 
 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 1989137
 Han Feizi, Chapter 49, Wu Du 五蠹, Han Feizi138
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sophisticated system, the intention of which is to limit rulers’ arbitrary interests as 
well as help rulers to establish a peaceful, well-organized state. It, fa, instructs rulers 
in their moral ideas in governance, such as selecting ministers and promoting them 
according to their achievements instead of rulers’ preference. It teaches rulers to 
consider about circumstances while making decisions because blindly copying 
ancestors is not a moral governing; it enlightens rulers do not intentionally chasing 
fames such as benevolence and moral because it would never gotten when pursue 
deliberately. Fa is not as immoral as others have portrayed it. It has moral dimensions.  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CHAPTER 6 
THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT 
 What has been critiqued most strongly is the concept of punishment in 
Legalist philosophy. Strictly speaking, critics have targeted what they understand to 
be cruel torture. It is the punching bag of Legalism and it has been thought of as 
immoral because of its cruelty. However, cruelty is the most important part of 
punishment. In this chapter, the reasons why Han Fei advocated penalty and his 
anticipation are going to be cited with other texts in order to their show moral 
dimension.  
 Generally speaking, the endorsement of cruel punishment is entirely based on 
human nature: humans are born with a hatred of harm. If humans were born with a 
hatred of money, physical penalties would not be so cruel. Strictly applied punishment 
actually is a protection to innocent majorities. It is undeniable that most people in 
society have no opportunity to test how cruel the punishment is all their lives; 
penalties are designed and applied for evils that disadvantage the stability of society. 
Punishing evils can never be thought of as immoral. This is the logic of Legalist 
punishment and it is also a moral dimension of Legalism. 
 Most scholars have critiqued Han Fei’s attitude towards punishment. Graham, 
for example, has written: “the Legalists stand alone in appreciating that the realisation 
of beneficial policies depends on institutions rather than good intentions.”  139
Unfortunately, these scholars have neglected the reality and Legalism’s success, so 
their conclusions are inaccurate. Although Han Fei’s ideal society has not been 
 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p.29, 1989139
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established, his philosophy has been accepted by multiple rulers. At least these rulers 
were attracted by the hidden morality if it could be applied successfully. If 
punishment, as one of the two handles emphasized by Han Fei throughout his works, 
is immoral, it would not be applied by so many moral, famous, successful, and great 
ruler such as Emperor Gaozu of Han Dynasty.  
 First of all, Han Fei does think punishment is a moral instrument in 
governance, as evidenced in the following examples:  
 Ð¤ȐúARȒƺ¤ȐAȎ  140
 Hence law is the origin of supremacy and penalty is the beginning of 
love.  141
This is exactly what Han Fei writes in his work. It must be hard for the uninitiated to 
understand his philosophy at first, so an explanation from the very beginning is 
required.  
 This idea of cruel torture comes from Han Fei’s understanding of human 
nature, and then according to human nature, he establishes this system.  
Ŕİ	Ȑº_-Ȏ-¤ȐöȐÐŢƣ,ȒŢƣ,
ÿżĥâBİ7ìǺȎ  142
Generally speaking, the order of All-under-Heaven must accord with 
human feelings. Human feelings have likes and dislikes, wherefore 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 54, Xin Du 心度, Han Feizi140
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 327141
 Han Feizi, Chapter 48, Ba Jing 八经. This chapter contains eight principles that 142
Han Fei thought are keys to govern state, they combine fa法, shu术, shi势.  But all 
principles are developed based on his understanding of human nature. The 
combination’s morality will be discussed in latter chapter. 
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reward and punishment can be applied. If reward and punishment are 
applicable, prohibitions and orders will prevail and the course of 
government will be accomplished.   143
This idea develops from Xunzi’s idea that humans’ proper actions are all intended. 
However, Han Fei has a more negative perspective; he suggests that nothing can be 
changed from the root, and that it is better not to change people but to shape their 
behaviors. In Ivanhoe’s study, he agrees with this interpretation of Han Fei’s 
perspective:  
He did not believe human nature had any particular shape or content; 
he thought we are self-interested creatures and that in all but the most 
rare of cases, this aspect of human nature could not be fundamentally 
altered or ameliorated. The best strategy is to abandon the futile effort 
to change or build character and instead focus on channeling and 
encouraging proper behaviors.   144
Forbidding subjects from doing things that can hurt society is not immoral; no one 
would say punish a murderer is immoral. In his work, he mentioned several other 
examples to display his idea better:  
Zŋsƺ¤ȐƼAZÂ¤òȐB
AZ^ǩ¤Ȓµ%Â
ƎŪȐÐƼºē¤ȎZŋ²ƺ¤ȐƼAZÂ¤Ȑ
AZ^
ǩ¤ȒµŭtÂBŷtŪȐÐƼēȎ  145
In the light of the so-called “heavy penalties”, what the culprits can 
gain, is slight, but what the superior inflicts, is great. As the people 
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 258143
 Philip J. Ivanhoe, Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation. Journal of Chinese 144
Philosophy 38:1 (March 2011) 31-45, at 36
 Han Feizi, Chapter 46, Liu Fan 六反, Han Feizi145
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never venture a big penalty for the sake of a small gain, malefactions 
will eventually disappear. In the face of the so-called “light penalties”, 
however, what the culprits gain, is great, but what the superior inflicts, 
is slight. As the people long for the profit and ignore the slight 
punishment, malefactions never will disappear.  146
This is the famous thinking that has been known as “using punishment to stop 
evils” (yi xing zhi xing %ƺēƺ). Focusing on cruel torture itself is limited, because 
any judgement is subjective. To a subject who is going to be executed, execution is 
immoral. To people whose relatives are going to be executed, execution is immoral. 
But to those whose relatives been hurt by criminals, anything that is moral to 
criminals is immoral. When we are trying to judge, we need to be rational and logical. 
As Han Fei explains:  
 :źƺƣȐLňōȐÂƼƏBÞĞȐ»Z%İȎ   147
 To loosen censure and punishment and give pardons and favors, is to 
benefit the crooks and injure the good. I tis not the way to attain 
political order.     148
Treating evils morally is immoral to the majority. In contrast, to treat the majority 
morally, evil must be must treated immorally. One characteristic of Legalism is its 
equitable nature, and it is rational and fair for subjects, especially those who are not 
government ministers.  
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 244146
 Han Feizi, Chapter 37, Nan Er 难二, Han Feizi147
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 158148
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 ČĦȐǌǥďȎAZ^ȐÜ¤ǭƹȐĻ¤ǭ£ĜȎ  149
 The law does not fawn on the noble; the string does not yield to the 
crooked. Whatever the law applies to, the wise cannot reject nor can 
the brave defy.  150
It is a protection to the majority of the society, which is a moral instrument, as higher 
classes can easily use their authority to plunder common people’s profit. 
 When analyzing a pragmatic philosophy, it is valuable to assess the 
practicability of its principles. In the case of cruel torture, it is a useful punishment 
that functions not only as a measure but also as a caution. It helps governing: 
ƺħBµÎȐŢƂBƼȐÐİµ¤ȐƺħȍİAÁȐŢƂȍ
÷ARȎ  151
If penalty triumphs, the people are quiet; if reward over-flows, culprits 
appear. Therefore the triumph of penalty is the beginning of order; the 
overflow of reward, the origin of chaos.  152
The fact of this principle is that evils are stopped because of people’s calculation. No 
evil is not immoral. Letting people know whether they would be punished before they 
act is not immoral either. This idea is similar to but not totally the same as Winston’s 
view. It has the similar effects as ritual education that teaches people what to do and 
what they should not do, and reaches the same destination that Xunzi advocated. 
 Han Feizi, Chapter 6, You Du 有度, Han Feizi149
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 1/p. 45150
 Han Feizi, Chapter 54, Xin Du 心度, Han Feizi151
 Liao, The Complete Work of Han Fei Tzu. 2/p. 326152
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Although they belong to different schools and use different instruments, their 
fundamental conclusions are much the same. 
 It is important to bear in mind that Han Fei’s urgent goal is establishing a 
peaceful and stable society. Punishment is only an instrument that is used to reduce 
the amount of violence and evil that threatens harmony. It can be thought of as moral, 
as Han Fei asserts. He understands human nature and sets a goal that is to end chaos. 
The most effective way is the best way. It solves subjects’ essential problem from the 
root.  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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
	 Due to the characteristics of ancient Chinese Legalism, there are many 
scholars who have thought that Legalism is immoral. They have tried to criticize it by 
comparing it with some Western theories, or by comparing it with other ancient 
philosophical schools, or by applying it in the context of today’s knowledge. It is 
unscientific and unreasonable that such an immoral philosophy would last this long, 
so gradually many scholars started to think about the core of Legalism, and they then 
noticed some moral dimensions of Legalism.  
 In this paper, I have drawn heavily on original texts and explained key 
passages in detail to express the morality of Legalism. First of all, I reviewed two 
scholarly papers and critiqued some apparent misreadings of Legalism. Schneider’s 
“Where Han Fei Errs” argues that Legalism is immoral because of Han Fei’s 
perspective of how to being a good ruler. He critiques the idea that a ruler should 
staying isolated and staying mysteries. However, they are moral strategies because 
these two protect both sides of the court. On one hand, Han Fei’s strategy reduces 
opportunities that a ruler insert self-interest in governance and later lead to disorder. 
On the other hand, his idea protects the ruler been threatened by subjects. I have also 
explained some features that had been thought of as immoral of the ruler by Schneider 
by citing original the Han Feizi text.  
 Winston’s paper claimed that there are moral dimensions to Legalism. I agree 
some of his idea but I doubt the method he uses in his paper. Because his method 
leads to a dilemma that is Legalism is immoral but there are moral dimensions. I have 
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critiqued the way that Winston used comparison with modern, Western ideas to make 
his argument about Legalist immorality. I have also corrected the understanding of 
Rule by Law set by Legalists to make it clear that Legalism is moral in general in that 
age, all based on the original text.  
 Then I introduce the understanding of human nature. An understanding of 
human nature is the basis of philosophy and Legalists created political strategies. 
Xunzi as Han Fei’s teacher raised evil human nature theory and Han Fei developed it 
into a comprehensive study. I argue li system advocated by Xunzi is immoral depend 
on human nature while fa system is moral to the majority of subjects in that era. At 
the same time, the comparison between li and fa leads to a conclusion that is Legalism 
is moral. Li emphasizes education in order to restrict subjects themselves; it has been 
found immoral up to human nature. Li also emphasizes inheritance of ancestors; it has 
been found impractical because of the characteristic of the age. Then fa, that is 
opposite to these, must be moral thinking.  
 Other features of Legalism have also been discussed based on original text. 
Shi, shu, and fa, have been discussed one by one to show moral dimensions of each of 
them. Nature of citizenship shows Han Fei’s moral idea, he tries to reduce threats 
inner state. Promulgated principles must be a moral character as it cautions subjects 
ahead of they behave. And finally, Han Fei’s perspective is a combination of shi, shu, 
and fa and it is a moral instrument for both rules and subjects.  
 As the feature of the age, a ruler is unavoidable character of the state. 
Legalism aims to balance the power of Kingship. It is a moral study as it reduces the 
possibilities that a ruler is not a good one, and it also tries to protect subjects when a 
ruler is self-interest. 
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 Punishment is another moral governing policy. It is built up based on human 
nature that is people born in a hatred of harm and a love of profit. It may seems 
immoral to subjects but it is moral. Cruelty is a serious warning to subjects in order to 
shape their behaviors. Coincides with justice in actuality, cruelty strictly applied on 
those wrongdoers who does not follow laws. It is moral as it is fair to the majority 
who do follow governance.  
 In general, I have quoted materials to support my argument that Legalism is 
moral. The majority of evidence was drawn from the Han Feizi and some from other 
Legalist philosophers. I have also made us of relevant secondary sources from 
scholars who think Legalism has moral dimensions. So in the end, on the basis of 
premises given above, Legalism has been shown to be a moral philosophy.  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ƻŞȐBĦĦâǺȎ  153
Dredge Obstruct 
During the time when heaven and earth were established, and the people were 
produced, people knew their mothers but not their fathers. Their way was to love their 
relatives and to be fond of what was their own. From loving their relatives came 
discrimination, and, from fondness of what was their own, insecurity. As the people 
increased and were preoccupied with discrimination and insecurity, they fell into 
disorder. At that time, people were intent on excelling others and subjected each other 
by means of force; the former led to quarrels and the latter to disputes. If in disputes, 
there were no justice, no one would be satisfied; therefore men of talent established 
equity and justice and instituted unselfishness, so that people began to talk of moral 
virtue. At that time, the idea of loving one’s relatives began to disappear and that of 
 Lord of Shang, Chapter 7 Dredge Obstruct *ƌ, The Book of Lord of Shang. 153
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honoring talent arose. Now virtue men are concerned with love and the way of 
talented men is to outvie one another. As people increased and were not restrained and 
had for long been in the way outvying one another, there was again disorder. 
Therefore, a sage, who received the administration, made divisions of land and 
property, of men and women. Divisions having been established, it was necessary to 
have those, who could enforce them. Thereupon, he established officials. These 
having been established, it was necessary yo have some one to unify them. So he set 
up a prince. Once a prince had been set up, the idea of honoring talent disappeared 
and that of prizing honor arose.  154
 Duyvendak, The book of Lord of Shang, p.226154
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